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JOAN W. HOWARTH* 
Executing White Masculinities: 
Learning from Karla Faye Tucker 
Gender is a constant struggle.1 Throughout our lives, we contend with multiple unstable and oppositional social 
constructions of gender, or hierarchies of masculinities and femi-
ninities.2 Knowing, or trying to know, who is male and who is 
female, and how men and women should act, is a major part of 
the structure of our identities, our societies, and our democracy. 
These gender questions are not separate from race or class;3 to-
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las 
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James E. Rogers Research Fund at UNLV, and from the Center for Social Justice at 
Boalt Hall, where I was Scholar-in-Residence during 2000-01. I benefited there 
from the excellent research assistance of Jee Park and Liz Garfinkle. I thank An-
nette Appell and Lynne Henderson for very helpful comments on earlier drafts, 
Matthew Wright for superb library assistance, and the organizers of and participants 
in this Symposium. I also thank the Oregon Law Review, especially Rick Mellen, 
Nicole Huberty, and Nancy Farmer. 
I "To the extent that gender is an assignment, it is an assignment which is never 
quite carried out according to expectation, whose addressee never quite inhabits the 
ideal s/he is compelled to approximate." JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 
231 (1993) [hereinafter BUTLER, BODlES]. 
2 By gender, I mean a systematic social construction of masculinity and femininity 
that is little, if at all, constrained by biology. See generally, Sandra Harding, Intro-
duction: Is There a Feminist Methodology?, in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY 1 
(Sandra Harding ed., 1987). The social constructs cf masculine and feminine are 
"metaphors we live by." GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE 
LIVE By (1980). Use of the plural terms "masculinities" and "femininities" empha-
sizes the "diverse and differentially empowered" versions of masculinities or femi-
ninities and deliberately complicates the idea of a single, uniform masculinity or 
femininity understood predominantly in relation to each other. RICHARD COLLIER, 
MASCULINITIES, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY 4 (1998). 
3 On the inseparability of race and gender, see Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Be-
yond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew, in WORDS THAT 
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMEND. 
MENT 111, 113-20 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993); Adrien Katherine Wing, Brief 
Reflections Toward a Multiplicative Theory and Praxis of Being, in CRITICAL RACE 
FEMINISM: A READER 27 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); Paulette M. Caldwell, 
A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 
365,374. 
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gether for example, they shape what is expected of a poor young 
White man or a middle-class, African American grandmother. 
Racialized and class-based, gender helps to tell us who is fright-
ening, who is powerful, and who is human. 
Many observers understand the death penalty in the United 
States as a story of racial injustice.4 Capital punishment is also a 
gender struggle.5 The lopsided demographics-men commit 
most crimes6-suggest that all crime and punishment is deeply 
gendered. The fact that death row is even more overwhelmingly 
4 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L USA, KILLING WITH PREJUDICE: RACE AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY (1999); DAVID c. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990); JESSE JACKSON, SR., 
ET AL., LEGAL LYNCHING: THE DEATH PENALTY AND AMERICA's FUTURE (2001); 
David C. Baldus et a!., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: 
A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CaNsT. L. 3 (2001) [hereinafter Baldus, 
Peremptory Challenges]; David C. Baldus et a!., Racial Discrimination and the Death 
Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent 
Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998); John H. Blume et a!., 
Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
1771 (1998); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of 
Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
433 (1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the 
Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519 
(1995); Ruth E. Friedman, Statistics and Death: The Conspicuous Role of Race Bias 
in the Administration of the Death Penalty, 11 LA RAZA L.J. 75 (1999); Cynthia K.Y. 
Lee, Race and the Victim: An Examination of Capital Sentencing and Guilt Attribu-
tion Studies, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 533 (1998); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capi-
tal Prosecutor's Perspective: Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
1811 (1998). 
5 See, e.g., Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task 
Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1345 [hereinafter Howarth, Deciding to 
Kill]. 
The power of the law is manifest in [the decision of a jury to punish some-
one by death]. If gendered structures in fact operate within apparently 
neutral legal principles and procedures, they will be deeply at work in the 
legal procedures that give the ultimate task-deciding life or death-to a 
person, a juror. 
[d. at 1350; see also Victor L. Streib, Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex 
Bias in a Masculine Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 433 (2002) [hereinafter Streib, 
Gendering ]. 
6 "One of the more striking features of crime-both violent and nonviolent-is its 
maleness." Ngaire Naffine, Book Review, 26 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 
572 (2001); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY 211 (1993) (explaining that women have historically been "shut out of 
key roles in criminal justice" and that "women criminals were always in short sup-
ply"). Ninety-two percent of federal inmates are men; ninety-five percent of state 
inmates are men. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Of-
fenders Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/crimoff.htm(lastvisitedApr.11. 
2002). 
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male 7 than other parts of prison points to capital punishment as a 
specific construction site of gender. Our system of capital pun-
ishment, with its elaborate procedures and ritualized executions, 
enacts deep and powerful aspirations to masculinity. Kenneth 
Karst reminds us: "The pursuit of manhood, above all, consists 
in expressions of power, .on repeated occasions."8 Capital pun-
ishment consists of repeated expressions of lethal power author-
ized by law.9 Gender helps to explain why we execute, and it 
helps to determine who we execute. 
As with other parts of the criminal justice system, the mascu-
linities produced and reproduced by the death penalty are deeply 
racialized. lO Although men of color disproportionately populate 
death row,ll most death judgments are imposed to punish male 
killers of White victimsP A Black man cQndemned to die, dan-
gerous and without remorse, is one representation of masculinity 
produced and reproduced by American capital punishment; a 
Black man, subdued and humiliated, strapped onto the execu-
7 Approximately 98.5% of the people on death row in this country are men. 
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Death Row U.S.A.: Spring 2002, 
at 3, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglDEATHROWUSArecent.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Death Row U.S.A.]. 
B Kenneth L. Karst, "The Way Women Are": Some Notes in the Margin for Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 619, 622 (1998) [hereinafter Karst, Women]. 
9 As the person on death row is objectified/destroyed, the legal process that 
carries out the execution is objectified/glorified. The death penalty ritual is 
a symbolic power surge that reflects and builds the power of law. Each 
execution sends an arrogant message, boasting that the legal system is ca-
pable of using its own rules to convert killing a person into something law-
ful. The legal process and its participants absorb and assume the power 
rendered by the execution. 
Joan W. Howarth, Review Essay: Feminism, Lawyering, and Death Row, 2 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 401, 418 (1992) [hereinafter Howarth, Feminism]. 
to Gender is not something that we inhabit or embody so much as something 
we negotiate on an ongoing basis within the context of power relations .... 
[Radically destabilizing conflicts of gender systems make] gender available 
to all sides in any context, which, in turn, means that the variability of gen-
der presents both dangers and powerful possibilities to the strategies of the 
condemned and of the state. 
Barbara Cruikshank, Feminism and Punishment, 24 StGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & 
SOC'Y 1113, 1115 (1999); see, e.g., JAMES W. MESSERSCHMIDT, MASCULINITIES AND 
CRIME: CRITIQUE AND RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THEORY (1993); RACE AND THE 
SUBJECT OF MASCULINITIES (Harry Stecopoulos & Michael Uebel eds., 1997); An-
gela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 
779 (2000). 
11 Death Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 3. Death row consists of 1678 Whites, 1593 
African Americans, 347 Latina/os, 41 Asians, and 41 Native Americans. Id. 
12 Eighty-one percent of the victims of defendants executed since 1976 have been 
White. Id. at 8. 
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tioner's gurney, is another.13 These different pictures of con-
demned men enact two versions of Black masculinities, which, in 
turn, produce different versions of the racialized masculinity of 
the executioner or even in the execution itself.14 This system of 
capital punishment can be usefully understood as a performance 
of White masculinities. 
The gender of capital punishment, specifically the White mas-
culinities of the death penalty, help to sustain it. The death pen-
alty consists mainly of gender violence of men against menY In 
short, the masculinities of the death penalty are performed-
proven-in relation to the masculinities of the condemned. 
Thus, femininity of the condemned disrupts the system's effec-
tiveness, at least symbolically. In some sense, then, executions of 
feminine subjects are gender mistakes, placing the masculine au-
thority of the state at risk.16 The 1998 execution by Texas of ul-
tra-feminine Karla Faye Tucker was such a gender and racial 
mistake. Although guilty of a gruesome double murder by pick-
axe, by the time of her execution Karla Faye Tucker had been 
seen by many Americans to be an attractive, pious, charming, 
and sweet young White woman, the embodiment of White femi-
ninity. Karla Faye Tucker's execution was troubling because cap-
ital punishment should protect White innocence, not kill it. 
Identifying capital punishment as a cultural and political per-
13 See, e.g., Joan W. Howarth, Representing Black Male Innocence, 1 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 97, 102-08 (1997) [hereinafter Howarth, Black Male Innocence] (dis-
cussing socially constructed identity of African American men as dangerous 
criminals). Currently forty-three percent of the men on death row are African 
American. Death Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 3. 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 57-81 (describing capital punishment as a 
gender performance); cf Robert A. Burt, Democracy, Equality, and the Death Pen-
alty, in THE RULE OF LAW 80, 93 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) [hereinafter Burt, Democ-
racy] (suggesting that support for the death penalty reflects White fear of Black 
retaliations for subjugation). 
15 Cf Harris, supra note 10, at 779 ("since most victims of violent crime are male, 
it may be that more men than women suffer from gender violence."). 
16 Timothy Kaufman-Osborn has argued that, given the state's need to "obscure 
the brutality of official killing," the execution of a woman, like a botched execution, 
"may impair the state's quest to secure unequivocal control over the semiotic import 
of its violence." Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving the Late Liberal State: On 
Capital Punishment in an Age of Gender Confusion, 24 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE 
& SOC'y 1119, 1124 (1999) [hereinafter Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving]. The contro-
versial execution of convicted Communist spy Ethel Rosenberg in 1953 was, in fact, 
botched, in that second and third cycles of electricity were required to kill her. ROB-
ERT JAY LIFI"ON & GREG MITCHELL, WHO OWNS DEATH?: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 
THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, AND THE END OF EXECUTIONS 51 (2000). 
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formance or negotiation of White' masculinities is not declaring it 
a problem of White men, or even of men in general or White 
people in generalP Support for capital punishment is a political 
position, one that men and women of all races have the capacity 
to embrace or reject. Although fewer women than men and 
fewer Blacks than Whites, support the death penalty,18 women of 
all races and men of color are just as capable of voting for, prose-
cuting, affirming, and cheering for executions.19 No natural posi-
tion inclines men to violence and women to peacefulness,2o or 
even men to masculinity and women to the feminine. Aspira-
tions to masculinity are not reserved for men. 
Understanding the gender in capital punishment requires ac-
knowledging that qualities of masculine and feminine are not 
necessarily aligned with biological males and females.21 Justice 
William Rehnquist pr~vides authority for this point. When he 
17 I am suggesting that, in the United States, the cultural practice of Whiteness 
(see IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE By LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCI'ION OF RACE 
(1996» and of capital punishment reinforce each other. For a discussion of race as 
culture, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color Blind," 44 STAN. 
L. REV. 1,4-5,56-58 (1991). For a demonstration that some meanings of Whiteness 
are not necessarily limited to Whites, see, e.g., Suzanne A. Kim, Comment, "Yellow" 
Skin, "White" Masks: Asian American "Impersonations" of Whiteness and the Femi-
nist Critique of Liberal Equality, 8 ASIAN L.J. 89 (2001); see also Janine Young Kim, 
Note, Are Asians Black? The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the Contem-
porary Significance of the BlacklWhite Paradigm, 108 YALE L.J. 2385 (1999). 
18 See, e.g., LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 217-18; Phoebe C. Ellsworth & 
Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death Pen-
alty, J. Soc. ISSUES, Summer 1994, at 24 [hereinafter Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening 
of the Attitudes]; see also infra text accompanying notes 88-92 (discussing distortion 
of isolating gender from race or class in this comparison between men and women). 
19 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Women in Black, N. YORKER, Oct. 30, 2000, at 48, 54 
(describing fierce death penalty records of two women judges in Texas). 
20 See Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9, at 411. 
My argument is not that feminists should oppose executions because vio-
lence is male, or because women's nature is nonviolent. Such claims ob-
scure the more complicated and perhaps distressing reality .... Feminists 
should work against the death penalty not because women are nonviolent, 
but because the opposite is true. Opposition to executions is a political 
choice of women and men, all of whom have the capacity for violence and 
destruction. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
21 Judith Butler has written: 
When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically indepen-
dent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the conse-
quence that man and masculine might just as easily signify a female body 
as a male one, and woman and feminine a male body as easily as a female 
one. 
JUDrrH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDEN· 
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was a law clerk, Rehnquist complained in a memo to Justice 
Clark that the "highest court of the nation" was handling death 
penalty cases "like a bunch of old women."22 Young Rehnquist's 
complaint is useful not simply to illustrate the subordinated rela-
tionship between the perceived weak, feminine approach versus 
the strong, masculine approach;23 it also highlights the perfectly 
coherent sting in describing the all-male court with the sneering 
charge of acting like old women. Gender is fundamental yet in-
secure, always ready for renegotiation, never stable, never some-
thing on which to rely. Thus, gender is more fluid and dangerous 
than Kenneth Karst suggests when he writes of the women stu-
dents at the Virginia Military Institute, "not a single one of them 
needed to prove that she is a real man. ,,24 Perhaps some of them 
do.2s 
TITY, 6 (1990) [hereinafter BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE]. See generally JUDITH 
HALBERSTAM, FEMALE MASCULINITY (1998). 
22 DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SU-
PREME COURT 34 (1992). We may find some irony in the fact that the two sitting 
justices of the Supreme Court who have expressed reservations about our death 
penalty system are the two old women. See, e.g., Henry Weinstein, Death Penalty 
Study Suggests Errors, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, at Al3 ("[E]ven two Supreme 
Court justices-Sandra Day O'Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg-[have] recently 
expressed doubts about whether the process is working fairly."); Charles Lane & 
Michael A. Fletcher, High Court Takes Up Two Big Issues: School Vouchers and 
Death Penalty Spark Lively Debate, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2002, at A6 ("Two jus-
tices, [Sandra Day] O'Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, have publicly voiced their 
concerns about the quality of legal advice given to capital defendants."). Noting that 
Minnesota does not have the death penalty, Justice O'Connor told the Minnesota 
Women Lawyers' Association, "You must breathe a big sigh of relief every day." 
O'Connor Questions Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,2001, at A9. 
23 We know that Rehnquist did not choose the metaphor of old women to 
suggest that the Court's handling of capital cases was marked by wisdom, 
endurance, and strength. More likely he meant that the Court was too ner-
vous about executions, perhaps too fussy, and certainly too weak. Rehn-
quist wanted the capital doctrine produced by the most authoritative court 
to be clear, forceful, and more-well, manly. 
Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1354. 
24 Karst, Women, supra note 8, at 625. Some women aviators in the Navy, for 
example, have embraced the masculine culture. 
Many women who made a career as Navy aviators, though they were not 
allowed in combat, had become part of the swaggering subculture-a 
group whose death-defying daily routines set them apart within the Navy. 
They talked tough and weren't prissy about sex, and one would occasion-
ally show her spirit by grabbing a male colleague's crotch and Shouting, 
"Package check!" 
Peter J. Boyer, Admiral Boorda's War, N. YORKER, Sept. 16, 1996, at 68, 71-72. 
25 See generally Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include 
Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 392 (2001) (promoting focus on transgender rights to challenge 
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Neither static nor universal, the gender in any system of capital 
punishment is shaped by its particular culture and history. The 
Cherokee laws that entrusted women to decide whether captives 
should be killed or brought into the tribe reflected and created 
powerful meanings of masculinity and femininity specific to their 
times and places;26 so do the current Russian (and former Soviet) 
formal prohibitions against executing women.27 India's explicit 
recognition that a woman's sex is a factor indicating that she 
should not be executed, whatever her crime,28 constructs mascu-
linities and femininities in ways different from Russia and from 
the United States. Given the racial history and context of the 
death penalty in the United States, the masculinities of our ex-
ecutions are deeply racialized. Through his association with 
Texas' death penalty, George W. Bush, having racked up 152 ex-
ecutions29 like notches on a revolver, negotiated a particularly 
potent version of White American masculine identity. 
Given the masculinist symbolic and material heft of capital 
punishment, why is the gender in capital punishment almost30 in-
misguided association of gender with biology); Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male 
and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 265 (1999); Julie A. Greenberg, When Is a Man a Man, and When is a Woman a 
Woman?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 745, 746 n.7 (2000) (citing estimates that between .1 % 
and 4% of the population are intersexual, defined as people whose biological sex 
attributes are not all congruent) .. 
26 Rennard Strickland, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO 
COURT 26 (1975). Similarly, women were a force protecting accused murderers 
from the clan revenge system for dealing with homicide. Id. 
27 See Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female Offenders, 58 U. CiN. L. REV. 
845, 880 (1990) [hereinafter Streib, Female Offenders]. 
28 See Streib, Gendering, supra note 5, at 433. 
29 The State of Texas Department of Corrections maintains a list of Texas execu-
tions. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Death Row Information, Executed Offend-
ers, at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/staUexecutedoffenders.htm (last updated June 26, 
2002). 
30 The legal scholars who work this field are Professors Phyllis Crocker, Elizabeth 
Rapaport, Victor Streib, and myself. See, e.g., Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse 
and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143 (1999); 
Phyllis L. Crocker, Feminism and Defending Men on Death Row, 29 ST. MARY's L.J. 
981 (1998); Phyllis L. Crocker, Is the Death Penalty Good for Women?, 4 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 917 (2001); Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5; Howarth, Femi-
nism, supra note 9; Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: 
A Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507 
(1996) [hereinafter, Rapaport, Domestic Discount]; Elizabeth Rapaport, Staying 
Alive: Executive Clemency, Equal Protection, and the Politics of Gender in Women's 
Capital Cases, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 967 (2001) [hereinafter Rapaport, Staying 
Alive]; Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution of Women on 
the Cusp of the 21st Century, 26 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 581 (2000) [hereinafter 
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visible? Perhaps the maleness of death row31 is such old news32 
that it is hardly worth noticing. Perhaps, like the air we breathe, 
it is considered natural and thus unnoticed, except in occasional 
weather outbursts, like tornadoes. Karla Faye Tucker's execu-
tion caused such a tornado,. but the gender of capital punishment 
quickly receded from public awareness with six obscure execu-
tions of women after Karla Faye Tucker. 
Although the gender of capital punishment is forgotten, it has 
not become less important. Condemning females does not dis-
rupt the masculinities· of capital punishment, but condemning 
femininity does. This Article addresses, in turn, the gender in 
punishing by death, the gender of those chosen for death, and the 
gender-bending execution of Karla Faye Tucker. By understand-
ing what Justice Blackmun called the "machinery of death"33 as 
repeated performances34 of White masculinities, we might loosen 
Rapaport, Damned]; Elizabeth Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and the 
Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 501 (1990); Elizabeth Rapaport, The 
Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination, 25 LAW & SOC'y REV. 367 (1991) [here-
inafter Rapaport, Gender Discrimination]; Victor L. Streib, America's Adversion to 
Executing Women, 1 OHIO N.U. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1997); Victor L. Streib, Death 
Penalty for Battered Women, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163 (1992); Victor L. Streib, 
Death Penalty for Lesbians, 1 NAT'L. J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 104 (1995); Streib, 
Female Offenders, supra note 27; Streib, Gendering, supra note 5; see also Cruik-
shank, supra note 10; Renee Heberle, Disciplining Gender; or, are Women Getting 
away with Murder?, 24 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'y 1103 (1999); Timothy 
V. Kaufman-Osborn, Gender and the Death Penalty: Introduction, 24 SIGNS: J. WO-
MEN CULTURE & SOC'y 1097 (1999) [hereinafter Kaufman-Osborn, Introduction]; 
Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16. 
31 As of January 1, 2002, there were 3657 men and fifty-four women on death rows 
in the United States. Death Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 3. The percentage of 
women on death row has been consistently around two percent for several years. 
Streib, Gendering, supra note 5, at 439, 
32 Justice Thurgood Marshall noted "overwhelming evidence that the death pen-
alty is employed against men and not women" thirty years ago. Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 365 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
33 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from den. of 
cert.). 
34 See, e.g., BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 21, at 136-39 (describing gen-
der as a performance). "The practice by which gendering occurs, the embodying of 
norms, is a compulsory practice, a forcible production .... " BUTLER, BODIES, supra 
note 1, at 231. 
In this sense, gender is not a noun, but neither is it a set of free-floating 
attributes . . . . Hence, ... gender proves to be performative-that is, 
constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, gender is al-
ways a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist 
the deed. 
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 21, at 24-25. 
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our attraction to capital punishment35 and to hierarchies of 
racialized gender. 36 
I 
EXECUTIONS PRODUCING MASCULINITIES 
A. The Symbolic Power of Crime 
Jonathan Simon urges us "to understand why crime is such a 
compelling story about ourselves."37 The masculinities of crime 
and punishment are a large part of the answer. All crime and 
punishment issues carry great cultural meaning.38 In part, we un-
derstand ourselves and our society based on how we understand 
crime and punishment.39 As David Garland has written, the 
criminal justice system "communicates meaning not just about 
crime and punishment but also about power, authority, legiti-
macy, normality, morality, personhood, social relations and a 
host of other tangential matters. "40 
35 See also Streib, Gendering, supra note 5, at 437-38 (calling the death penalty a 
"masculine sanctuary" and arguing that "[t]his perspective reveals more clearly than 
any other the true motivating forces behind the general death penalty debate."). 
36 "A serious feminist project for the theory of law is not simply to embrace the 
'female' side of these dualisms, the task undertaken by relational feminists, but fur-
ther to strip away the false male cover to reveal the messier reality~that is, to reject 
the basic dichotomies." Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1350 (citing to 
ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 4-5 (1988) and Mari Mat-
suda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 
11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989». 
37 Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime, in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM: Es-
SAYS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 171, 175 (Lawrence M. Friedman & George Fisher eds., 
1997). 
38 For a discussion of the cultural meanings of criminal justice, see David Garland, 
Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of Criminal Justice, 11 STUD. L. 
POLITICS & SOC'y 191 (1991). 
More than most legal phenomena, the practices of prohibiting and punish-
ing are directed outwards, towards the public-towards "society"-and 
claim to embody the sentiments and the moral vision not of lawyers, but of 
"the people." And whether or not this claim can be sustained, it makes 
penality a particularly apposite site of a culturalist approach .... 
Id. at 192. 
39 [d. at 192-93 ("the law's last-resort power to punish ... relies on meaning and 
symbols and representations that construe its own actions and weave them into the 
belief-systems, sensibilities, and cultural narratives of the social actors and audiences 
involved."). "Punishment is a dramatic, performative representation of the way 
things officially are and ought to be, whatever else the deviant would make of 
them." [d. at 208. "In the acts and institutions of punishment, the state-or ruling 
elite of whatever kind-self-consciously constructs its own public image and, in part, 
its .own reality." Id. 
40 [d. at 195. Garland continues, 
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Only recently have we noticed that crime and punishment are 
largely stories about men trying to be men.41 Masculinities are 
formed by race and class, in part by competition between men as 
well as through separation from women and from "feminine" 
men, or homosexuals.42 These formations are urgent and unset-
tled, and often policed and defended through violence.43 Law-
Penal signs and symbols are one part of a complex array of institutional 
discourses that seek to organize our moral and political understanding and 
to educate our sentiments and sensibilities. They provide a continuous, re-
petitive set of instructions as to how we should think about good and evil, 
normal and pathological, legitimize and iIIegitimize, order and disorder. 
Through their judgments, condemnations, and classifications they teach us 
how to judge, what to condemn, and how to classify, and they supply a set 
of languages, idioms, and vocabularies with which to do so. These signify-
ing practices also tell us where to locate social authority, how to preserve 
order and community, where to look for social dangers and how to feel 
about these matters .... 
[d. at 195. 
41 For considerations of gender in crime, see Mary Ellen Gale, Calling in the Girl 
Scouts: Feminist Legal Theory and Police Misconduct, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 691 
(2001); CRIMINOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS: FEMINIST READINGS IN CRIME AND 
JUSTICE (Kathleen Daly & Lisa Maher eds., 1998) [hereinafter CRIMINOLOGY AT 
THE CROSSROADS]; Kathleen Daly & Michael Tonry, Gender, Race, and Sentencing, 
22 CRIME & JUST. 201 (1997); JANIS ApPIER, POLICING WOMEN: THE SEXUAL 
POLITICS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE LAPD (1998); NGAIRE NAFFINE, FE· 
MALE CRIME: THE CONSTRUCTION OF WOMEN IN CRIMINOLOGY (1987); Dana M. 
Britton, Feminism in Criminology: Engendering the Outlaw, 571 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOc. SCI. 57, 58 (2000). "Criminology remains one of the most thor-
oughly masculinized of all social science fields; certainly, it is one of the last aca-
demic bastions in which scholars regularly restrict their studies to the activities and 
habits of men without feeling compelled to account for this." [d. (citation omitted). 
For discussions of masculinities in crime, see MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 10; JUST 
Boys DOING BUSINESS? MEN, MASCULINITIES, AND CRIME (Tim Newburn & Eliza-
beth A. Stanko eds., 1994); Kenneth Polk, Masculinity, Honour, and Confrontational 
Homicide, in CRIMINOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 41, at 188. 
42 See, e.g. , MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 10; RACE AND THE SUBJECT OF MASCU-
LINITIES, supra note 10. 
43 Law enforcement, like military combat, is culturally gendered male partly 
to preserve for men a monopoly of legitimize violence-a myth they can-
not relinquish without also surrendering what many men seem to believe, 
consciously or not, to be an indispensable core of their masculine identity, 
the capacity for domination of others and the regular performance of that 
domination to ensure their place in the male hierarchy. 
Gale, supra note 41, at 728 (footnote omitted). 
Men disempowered by racial or class status develop alternative rebellious 
ways of proving their manhood; at the same time, "dominant" men may 
envy "subordinate" men, and rebellious men may long to be accepted into 
the mainstream. In addition to these complex relationships with one an-
other, all men experience the pressures not to be women and not to be 
"faggots." The instability of masculine identity in the face of all these pres-
sure makes violence in defense of self-identity a constant possibility. 
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breaking, victimhood, and our responses to them perform 
gender, creating men and women. Capital punishment is an im-
portant chapter in this story. 
B. The Symbolic Power of Capital Punishment 
David Garland draws on sociology and anthropology to sug-
gest that punishment is so symbolically powerful because it is "an 
arena of social tension and social conflict"44 and because "the 
intractable problems of social and hum~n existence provide a 
rich soil for the development of myths, rites and symbols, as cul-
tures strive to control and make sense of these difficult areas of 
experience. "45 Killing is the most extreme form of social conflict; 
not surprisingly, the death penalty, a terrible murder followed by 
a state killing, harnesses and creates very strong symbolic mean-
ings. Death penalty cases are exceptional, dramatic, and compel-
ling. We, as a culture, notice them; indeed, as the most visible 
official response to crime, they are intended to be noticed. The 
execution has lethal physical consequences on the body of the 
condemned, but the ritualized killing of human life is fundamen-
tally a performance directed to and undertaken for the public.46 
The death penalty is a kind of popular moral entertainment,47 
an exercise of power so flamboyant48 that ordinary people per-
ceive themselves to have participated in it. Supporting the death 
penalty is taking action and ending frustration49 about crime and 
Harris, supra note 10, at 780. 
44 Garland, supra note 38, at 216. 
45 Id. at 216. "The practical business of punishing offenders thus takes place 
within a cultural space that is already laden with meaning and that lends itself easily 
to symbolic use." Id. 
46 See, e.g., id. at 197 ("[R]ituals and symbolic practices [of punishment] continue 
to operate as a kind of strategic counterpoint to policies of regulation-their chief 
target being the law-abiding population and those who straddle the boundaries be-
tween deviance and the norm."). 
47 Cf Simon, supra note 37, at 184 ("[I]nstead of backing away from our commit-
ment to governing through crime, we openly offer punishment for the purposes of 
warehousing the untrustworthy and creating moral entertainments (like chain gangs) 
for the virtuous. Whatever the merits of these purposes, neither augurs well for 
democratic practice."). 
48 Cf Burt, Democracy, supra note 14, at 93 (referring to the flamboyance of 
capital punishment). 
49 See Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, at 42 ("If 
there is anyone emotion that mediates between crime and support of the death 
penalty, it is probably frustration rather than fear. "). Ellsworth and Gross suggest 
that research about death penalty attitudes should focus on emotions, especially 
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general social breakdown.50 Crudely put, capital punishment 
functions less as crime control policy and more like the closest 
thing we have to an official snuff film. "Executed bodies perform 
their political mission well when their utter impotence, their ab-
solute lack of vitality, testifies to the robust agency. of the 
state .... "51 The cultural and public visibility of the death pen-
alty-as a symbol of power, of taking control, of doing justice-
makes it important as a potential site of knowledge about our-
selves and our society, and about gender. 
Social scientists confirm that attitudes toward the death pen-
alty are highly symbolic. 52 Some evidence suggests that "death 
penalty attitudes are a matter of self-identification."53 Indeed, 
perhaps "death penalty attitudes are not based on rational con-
siderations at all, but are fundamentally noninstrumental sym-
bolic attitudes, based on emotions and ideological self-image."54 
The deep symbolic power of crime and punishment is clearly 
linked to its extreme politicalization; a politician is able to take a 
stand without fear of being found wrong. "Criminal justice is-
sues ... are abstractions for most of the electorate. Even those 
who are victimized by crime have no way of appreciating the con-
sequences of different policies on incarceration."55 Capital pun-
ishment is not really about making anyone safer; it is a symbolic 
representation of taking revenge against crime.56 
frustration and anger. [d. at 45. They also posit that frustration and anger, not fear 
are the driving emotions. [d. 
[d. 
Anger is the most positive of the negative emotions, because it is the only 
one that confers a sense of power. When politicians argue, angrily, for the 
death penalty, they may communicate that they are in control, and at the 
same time arouse a satisfying sense of outrage and power in the voter. 
50 See, e.g. , Simon, supra note 37, at 176. Simon argues that voters in the United 
States and elsewhere have "affirmed the belief that social control is breaking down 
and that punishment of crime is the most promising strategy for checking that break-
down." [d. (footnote omitted). 
51 Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 1121. 
52 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, The Romance of Revenge: Capital Punishment in 
America, 13 STUD. L. POLITICS, & SOC'y 71, 88 (1993) [hereinafter Gross, Romance] 
(referencing Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punish-
ment: A Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME 
& DELINQ. 116, 161-65 (1983)); see also Burt, Democracy, supra note 14, at 93 (sug-
gesting that support for the death penalty reflects White fear of Black retaliations 
for subjugation). 
53 Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, at 24. 
54 [d. at 31 (citations omitted). 
55 Gross, Romance, supra note 52, at 88. 
56 "People want the death penalty for revenge." Gross, Romance, supra note 52, 
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Virtually all powerful symbols of authority, morality, and jus-
tice are laden with gender. The symbolic power of capital pun-
ishment is the power of violence, both of the underlying crime 
and of the punishment.57 In a society in which our culture and 
our identities are bound by deep pressures and anxieties of gen-
der-masculine over feminine, masculine over masculine-the 
capacity and willingness to do violence is traditionally under-
stood to be crucial for men; or, as we might now say, crucial for 
performing masculinities. "[V]iolent acts committed by men, 
whether these acts break the law or are designed to uphold it, are 
often a way of demonstrating the perpetrator's manhood."58 
Masculine identity is linked to violence, both of the criminal and 
of the state.59 
The death penalty makes a statement about the power of vio-
lence and the meaning of death. It is an expression of public 
policy and political will that attempts to make sense of violence 
by recreating it. State killing sets apart the condemned, choosing 
them to be dramatically expelled from the community, from civi-
lization, from the world of the living.60 Capital punishment rep-
resents the ultimate power of the state over its citizens; at the 
at 79. Is the desire for revenge a masculine emotion? Samuel Gross uses as a proto-
type of personal vengeance "the grieving father tracking down and killing the killer 
of his child." Id. Perhaps our death penalty system is not only a substitute for the 
personal revenge of the father, but also an elaborate system to invite the mother to 
have a means of revenge. "The process by which we carry out this judgment has 
little in common with the conduct of an avenger. It is slow, passionless, imper-
sonal-unreliable, and rare." [d. at 80. 
57 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death 
Penalty-It's Getting Personal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1471 (1998) [hereinafter 
Gross, Update] (citing Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, 
at 32-33 ("Death penalty attitudes are about killing. "». 
58 Harris, supra note 10, at 780 (calling this violence "gender violence"). 
59 See, e.g., John Braithwaite & Kathleen Daly, Masculinities, Violence and Com-
munitarian Control, in CRIME CONTROL AND WOMEN: FEMINIST IMPLICATIONS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 151 (Susan L. Miller ed., 1998) [hereinafter CRIME CON-
TROL AND WOMEN]. 
Violence is gendered: it is a problem and consequence of masculinity. 
Contemporary state interventions to control violence are no less gendered: 
structures of response, from arrest through imprisonment, glorify tough 
cops, celebrate adversarial relations, and construct a virtuous 'protective' 
state by incarcerating or, in some countries, killing the "bad guys." 
Id. at 151. In some ways, the complex idea of moral violence itself represents duel-
ing masculinities. 
60 See Austin Sarat, Capital Punishment as a Legal, Political, and Cultural Fact: 
An Introduction, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, 
AND CULTURE 3, 9-10 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE KILLING STATE]. 
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same time, it. reinforces the powerlessness of the state to stop 
violence. Executions produce deep and complex messages about 
the might and authority of the state.61 
By dramatizing the violence of the state against the con-
demned, the death penalty creates a solidarity of people with the 
state, even among populations normally quite oppositional and 
resentful toward the government. Popular resentment is some-
how harnessed by the state in its war against criminals.62 In some 
ways, this functions like patriotism, or identification with the 
state in its violent efforts against a common enemy in war.63 
Phoebe Ellsworth and Samuel Gross have told us: 
It is not hard to understand why many people support capital 
punishment even though they believe it does not deter crime 
and is not fair. The death penalty is concrete, it is forceful, 
61 David Garland describes the meaning of a public execution: 
The public execution takes the form of a theatrical spectacle in which the 
sheer force of the sovereign's power is publicly displayed on the body of 
the condemned. At the same time, the vital connection between the sover-
eign and God is reinforced, not just by the display of the sovereign's power 
over life and death, but also by the religious language and symbolism (of 
the publicly announced sentence, the offender's ritualized confession and 
the cleric's prayers and benediction) that tie the law of the sovereign to the 
will of God and the natural order of things. In this form of punishment, 
authority is construed as absolute, divinely inspired and socially ascendent. 
Garland, supra note 38, at 208·09. Then Texas Governor George W. Bush explicitly 
invoked religious authority while justifying his own refusal to intervene in his state-
ment upon Karla Faye Tucker's execution: "Judgments about the heart and soul of 
an individual on death row are best made by a higher authority." Jesse Katz, Texas 
Executes Born-Again Woman After Appeal Fails, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1998, at AI. 
The constitutionally-mandated discretion as to whether any particular defendant 
should be executed (see infra text accompanying notes 160-63) co-exists uneasily 
with this ascendent, absolute authority. Garland suggests that, under a social con-
tract theory of punishment, punishment must be "dispensed in a controlled and law-
ful manner. The power that they symbolize, though still awesome in its way, is 
circumspect, clearly defined and precisely limited. It has the authority of duly en-
acted law." Garland, supra note 38, at 209. This is masculine at war with discretion. 
Certainty is at war with discretion. Force is at war with individuality. [d. at 208-09. 
62 See generally William E. Connolly, The Will, Capital Punishment, and Cultural 
War, in THE KILLING STATE, supra note 60, at 187 (describing politics of capital 
punishment within a culture of resentment). 
63 The current "War on Terrorism" might provoke a return to popular embrace of 
state legitimacy and purpose that permits a decline in the need to use symbolic ges-
tures such as the death penalty to respond to an otherwise "chronic 'legitimacy defi-
cit.'" Cf Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 1120 (drawing upon 
JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975». The 
masculine imagery and rhetoric of the War on Terrorism has been pervasive, sug-
gesting that it might be functioning as a response to a perhaps chronic "masculinity 
deficit" as well. 
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and it is final (which nothing else seems to be); it is something, 
and being for it means that you insist that something be 
done.64 " 
197 
In this way, the death penalty promises masculine satisfaction. 
Borrowing William Rehnquist's words, approving the death pen-
alty means that you are not responding to lawlessness "like a 
bunch of old women. "65 
Supporting the death penalty means that "you insist that some-
thing be done," but, of course, the something that is being done 
is the killing of poor people,66 mainly men, most of whom have 
been convicted of killing White people.67 Capital punishment as 
it is enacted tells a twisted story about crime, gender, race, and 
class. For example, it tells us that the most important victims of 
crime are White.68 It tells us that the worst criminals are poor. 
In these and many other ways, the manliness of executions and 
powerful masculinities of the death penalty, like other executions 
of gender, are performed through race and class.69 
C. The Manliness of Executions 
Manliness is constituted in part by physical strength, superior-
ity, and domination. Historically, executions displayed those 
traits: "[T]here must be an emphatic affirmation of power and its 
intrinsic superiority. And this superiority is not simply that of 
right, but that of the physical strength of the sovereign beating 
down upon the body of his adversary and mastering it .... "70 
"Manliness is one of those ideas that is often made real with 
violence. "71 
64 Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, at 42; cf How-
arth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1354. 
65 Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1353-54. 
66 See, e.g., Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories 
and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 563 (1995) (describing 
profound poverty in histories of most capital defendants). 
67 Eighty-one percent of the victims of defendants executed since 1976 have been 
white. Death Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 8. 
681d. 
69 Cf Karen D. Pyke, Class-Based Masculinities: The Interdependence of Gender, 
Class, and Interpersonal Power, 10 GENDER & SOC'y 527 (1996). 
70 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 49 
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1979). 
71 Harris, supra note 10, at 781, drawing on the work of literary theorist Elaine 
Scarry in THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 13-14 
(1985); see also Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 1121 (assessing the 
death penalty in light of Scarry's work). "Although Scarry draws her examples from 
the domains of war and torture, a perhaps still more obvious instance of what she 
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Today the violence of an execution is routinely hidden and 
minimized.72 The Florida Senate Majority Leader who witnessed 
Judy Buenoano's electrocution pronounced it "antiseptic," like 
"a grim ballet .... When they pulled the switch it was over.'>73 
The civilizing move to lethal injection partially obscures the vio-
lence of the execution.74 "Death is the culmination of a long se-
ries of procedures, performed by technicians under the 
surveillance of diverse, carefully trained administrators, recorded 
in scrupulous detail."75 This new, sanitized version of executions 
offers the same kind of partial invitation to women to become 
executioners as computerized warfare welcomes women into bat-
tle, that is, from the masculine physicality of the past to the infor-
mal masculine technology domain of the present.76 
However sanitized and bureaucratized, executions continue to 
be associated with White masculinity. This point is made, with-
out subtlety, in the recent film Monster's Ball,77 in which the 
work of capital punishment is linked to cruel, misogynist, White 
supremacist, violent hyper-masculinity. Billy Bob Thornton 
plays Hank, a prison guard and an executioner who is racist, 
mean, woman-hating, and gun-loving. His notion of manhood is 
domination and cruelty. The film shows his redemption, of which 
his first step is quitting his job as the executioner at the prison.78 
Having rejected the hyper-masculine identity of executioner, 
Hank ultimately remakes himself as a loving, generous man, 
someone capable of caring for and embracing the Black victims 
of the execution. Monster's Ball powerfully combines hyper-
masculinity of executions with racist identities. Hank's manhood 
calls 'analogical verification' is human sacrifice." [d. "[T]he consummation of a 
death sentence is one of the more striking means by which ... 'real human pain' is 
'converted into a regime's fiction of power.'" [d. at 18 (quoting Scarry). 
72 For a discussion of the role of law in hiding the violence of the death penalty, 
see Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1390-91. 
73 LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 59. 
74 Cf Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
75 Anne Norton, After the Terror: Mortality, Equality, Fraternity, in THE KILLING 
STATE, supra note 60, at 27. 
76 Perhaps in some way the move to lethal injections is related to the dominant 
ideology of supposed gender-neutrality in public life. See infra text accompanying 
notes 104-71 (discussing application of formal gender equality to the death penalty). 
77 MONSTER'S BALL (Lions Gate Films 2001). 
78 His son, Sonny, manifests kindness, cross-racial friendships, and decency. He is 
sneered at by his father and grandfather as being womanly. His kindness to a con-
demned prisoner and his physical revulsion at the execution are key signs of his 
womanly weakness. /d. 
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was once established by cruelty to women and to Black men; he 
becomes human, however, by rejecting this racist hyper-mascu-
line identity. In this, Monster's Ball follows William Rehnquist 
and many others who understand the willingness to impose death 
as a sign of masculinity.79 
The deep symbolic association between the death penalty and 
masculinities may influence specific aspects of the capital punish-
ment debate in complex ways. Robert Weisberg, Samuel Gross, 
and others have written about the profound ambivalence in the 
United States toward executions, namely that this country wants 
to have the death penalty, but we want it to exist without much 
use.80 Perhaps this ambivalence represents a cultural production 
of masculinity related to combatting the modern distaste for ex-
ecutions. Similarly, perhaps we defend ourselves against interna-
tional condemnation with a masculine national pride that 
carelessly dismisses all those countries that have given up execu-
tions as simply weak ("like a bunch of old women"). Finally, and 
more clearly, lack of willingness to conduct executions has 
marked political candidates as too infirm to lead. Personal aver-
sion to killing is damning for a politician, perhaps because it em-
bodies feminine weakness. In the hyper-agitated world of 
California politics, Dianne Feinstein beat John Van de Kamp in 
the 1990 governor's primary because Dianne Feinstein was 
"tougher" on the death penalty.81 On this issue, Feinstein wore 
the mantle of masculinity more effectively than Van de Kamp. 
D. Women Performing the Death Penalty 
If maintaining the machinery of death is a performance of mas-
culinity, given the deep associations between women and femi-
ninities we might expect that women's rates of participation in 
79 For example, Lifton and Mitchell ask about the prosecutor of Harris County, 
Texas, who has led Houston to become the death capital of the country, "Yet how 
tough is Holmes, really? He never attends an execution .... [L]ike so many others 
caught up in the killing process, he is all too willing to pass along responsibility. 
'Everyone who got death in Harris County,' he said, 'has gotten it from a jury.'" 
LIFroN & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 110-11. "Holmes claims he is not 'blood-
thirsty'; he's 'just a lawyer. I follow the law.'" [d. at 110. 
80 See Gross, Romance, supra note 52; Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305 (1983); cf Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 
1120 (predicting that the liberal state's dilemma related to executing women will be 
resolved with more women sentenced to death but few executed). 
81 Gross, Romance, supra note 52, at 92. 
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and support for capital punishment would be different than 
men's. 
Historically, women's civic participation as promoters and 
practitioners of death penalty policy has been mixed. Women 
make up a sizeable portion of the American anti-death penalty 
movement of today,82 and did so in the 1800S.83 Other women 
(and their children) were part of the crowds that gathered for 
public executions. For many decades after the end of public kill-
ings, women were not permitted to witness executions.84 Louis 
Masur describes that the end of public executions in the mid-
nineteenth century "turned the execution of criminals into an 
elite event centered around class and gender exclusion rather 
than communal instruction."85 More recently, in the era of for-
mal gender equality, which has eliminated most explicitly sex-
based exclusions,86 women have witnessed executions as officials, 
surviving victims, and reporters.87 
Today, social scientists commonly report that more men than 
women favor the death penalty.88 Isolating gender in this way 
obscures differences in race and class. If capital punishment is a 
performance of White masculinities, we would expect that the 
rates of people of color's participation in and support for capital 
punishment would be lower than Whites. Indeed, one study 
found that almost all district attorneys in death penalty states, the 
government lawyers with the discretion to seek death, are 
82 For a description of the anti-death penalty movement, see HERBERT H. 
HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT 
IN AMERICA, 1972-1994 (1996). Perhaps the most prominent anti-death penalty ac-
tivist is Sister Helen Prejean, author of DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS 
ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1993). 
83 LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 34. 
841d. at 31. 
85 LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1875, at 6 (1989). 
86 See infra text accompanying notes 104-17 (discussing formal gender equality 
especially as it relates to women being executed). 
87 State Senator Ginny Brown-Waite witnessed a bloody execution in Florida in 
1999 and interpreted the blood on the condemned man's shirt as a cross, a sign from 
God that either the condemned had made his peace with God or that God "was 
giving his blessing to Forida's execution policy." LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 
16, at 60. 
88 E.g., Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, at 21; LIF-
TON & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 217-18 (finding the gender gap less than might 
be expected for an issue of "violence" and noting that the 2000 ABC poll found 
male support for the death penalty at seventy-three percent, female at fifty-six 
percent). 
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White.89 As to public opinion, Whites support the death penalty 
much more than do African Americans or Latinos;90 White men 
support the death penalty much more than do African American 
men.91 Americans in high and middle-income levels are more 
likely than lower-income people to support the death penalty.92 
Women's attitudes about the death penalty reflect and sustain 
gendered qualities of violence and punishment. For example, 
culturally, women, rather than men, are more easily understood. 
to be victims.93 Interestingly, then, more women than men ques-
tion the death penalty, even though, to the extent that women 
see themselves as potential victims of crime,94 they may under-
stand themselves to be the possible beneficiaries of the death 
penalty.95 Apparent readiness to do violence may conflict with 
89 Pokorak, supra note 4, at 1817 (97.5% of district attorneys in death penalty 
states are White; 1.2% are African American; 1.2% are Latino). 
90 See, e.g., Pamela Paul, Pulse: The Death Penalty, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Nov. 
2001, at 22 ("In 2001, seventy-three percent of whites support the death penalty, 
compared with sixty-three percent of Hispanics and only forty-six percent of 
Blacks."). In January 2000 a survey for ABC News found a difference of thirty-one 
percentage points between White and Black support for the death penalty; sixty-
nine percent of Whites but only thirty-eight percent of Blacks favored the death 
penalty. LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 217. : 
91 One 1994 poll that adjusted results for race and gender found levels of support 
for the death penalty at 82.8% of White men, 74.9% of White women, 56.7% of 
Black males, and 47.5% of Black women. Baldus, Peremptory Challenge, supra 
note 4, at 20 n.40. 
92 See, e.g., id. at 21 (higher income correlates with support for the death pen-
alty); Ellsworth and Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, at 21 (middle 
class favors death penalty more than poor). Samuel Gross has suggested that our 
continued support for the death penalty (instead of following the many nations 
whose elites abolished capital punishment in spite of its popular support) may be 
based on the relatively stronger democratization of our criminal justice system. 
Gross, Romance, supra note 52, at 88. This supposition does not deal adequately 
with the evidence that Americans of lower incomes are less likely than wealthier 
ones to support the death penalty, and promotes a reassuring notion of effective 
democracy that is not justified by voting patterns and the race and class patterns of 
criminal justice in particular. " 
93 See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 25 (Cal. 1996) (claiming that its deci-
sion upholding use of "battered women's syndrome" would not "compel adoption of 
a 'reasonable gang member' standard"); Lorraine Schmall, Forgiving Guin Garcia: 
Women, the Death Penalty and Commutation, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 283, 288 (1996) 
(abused men on death row unlikely to have stories heara as women's may be heard); 
cf Janet C. Hoeffel, The Gender Gap: Revealing Inequities in A'dmission of Social 
Science Evidence in Criminal Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 41 (2001) 
(arguing that courts routinely deny to typically male and African American criminal 
defendants the same quality of evidence admitted for victimized women). 
94 See ESTHER MADRIZ, NOTHING BAD HAPPENS TO GOOD GIRLS: FEAR OF 
CRIME IN WOMEN'S LIVES (1997). 
95 Perhaps ironically, much of women's vulnerability to crime is hidden from offi-
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many women's aspirations to femininity.96 
Ordinary citizens participate in capital punishment policy not 
only as voters or respondents to pollsters, but also as jurors who 
make the life-or-death decision in capital cases.97 The decision to 
impose death is presented as a serious duty, one that takes cour-
age,98 a masculine virtue that men and women on the jury are 
invited to use. Women of all races and men of color are under-
represented on death-qualified juries, that is, juries from which 
people who would not impose death are eliminated.99 Perhaps 
the saddest evidence of women as outsiders to capital punish-
ment is the recent social science data suggesting that the pres-
ence of women on capital juries has no impact on the outcomes 
of capital cases.lOO The life or death decision is more likely to be 
cial statistics, in part because it is routine and legitimized. Britton, supra note 41, at 
68. Again, however, the isolation of gender from race and class distorts this infor-
mation. According to official statistics, women, compared to men, are under-
represented as victims of crime. Id. at 63-64. This un-raced category of "women" 
submerges important racial differences: African American women are more likely 
than White women to be victims of all kinds of violent crimes, with victimization 
rates that approximate White men's. African American women are more likely than 
White men to be victims of homicide. Id. at 64. African American men's rates of 
homicide victimization are eight times higher than White men's. Id. Thus endorse-
ment of capital punishment as policy appears not to correlate with real or perceived 
increased risks of criminal victimization. Official statistics, of course, reflect class 
and racial bias in policing. 
96 See Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1363 (suggesting that women 
may be less likely to qualify for capital juries because the readiness to inflict violence 
conflicts with feminine identities) .. 
97 See generally id. 
98 For example, the jurors in Timothy McVeigh's case were told by the prosecutor 
to "look into the eyes of a coward and tell him you will have courage." LIFTON & 
MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 147. 
99 Valerie P. Hans, Death by Jury, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LE-
GAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE ApPROACHES (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi 
eds.,1998). "Jurors who survive death qualification are demographically distinctive: 
They are more likely to be male, to be White, to be well off financially, to be Repub-
lican, and to be Protestant or Catholic." Id. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 
(1992) (upholding the exclusion of potential jurors who acknowledge that they will 
automatically vote for death, which might serve to exclude disporportionate num-
bers of White men); Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 231 n.9 (8th Cir. 1985) (Blacks 
subject to "systematic disproportionate removal"), overruled sub nom. Lockhart v. 
McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 692 n.7 (Cal. 1983), cert 
denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984) (potential disproportionate exclusion of women and 
Blacks alleviated by practice of also excluding automatic voters for the death pen-
alty, assumed to be more male and White). 
100 William J. Bowers et aI., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 171, 196 (2001). 
Why is it that the number of black women or white women on the jury did 
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determined by the race of the men on the jury. Specifically, in 
cases with a Black defendant and a White victim, the presence of 
five or more White male jurors "dramatically increased the likeli-
hood of a death sentence." The presence of even a single Black 
male juror "substantially reduced the likelihood of a death sen-
tence" in these cases. IOI Researchers have not found any impact 
from the participation of women of any race as capital jurors.I02 
Of course, in our current era of formal gender equality in which 
women should not be categorically excluded, the presence of wo-
men on the capital jury has a legitimizing role, whatever their 
impact on the decision being reached. 
Thus, today both men and women implement the masculine 
enterprise of the death penalty. The mechanics of executions 
have become less overtly violent and less gruesome, and, in our 
era of formal gender neutrality, many women have proven them-
selves man enough to participate. Women who participate easily 
adapt to the masculinity of the enterprise; an execution ordered 
by a woman is no less lethal, but the woman has proven her 
toughness. Like Dianne Feinstein, women may earn legitimacy 
for participation or even leadership in public life in part through 
the willingness to execute. In those cases, the masculinity of the 
death penalty empowers the woman, more than the woman 
changes the masculinity in executing the death penalty. Con-
versely, women may be particularly vulnerable to being vilified 
as too soft on crime and ousted from public leadership by pro-
death penalty forces, as in the prominent cases of former Califor-
nia Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird and former Tennes-
see Supreme Court Justice Penny White. I03 Even in an era when 
/d. 
not appreciably affect the likelihood of a death sentence is uncertain at this 
point? There is ample evidence that women behave differently in group 
interaction and group decision settings and that they are more reserved and 
less confrontational than men. But whatever female jurors add to the dy-
namics of jury deliberations, it did not appear to influence the sentencing 
outcomes significantly toward death or life. 
101 [d. at 195. 
102 [d. at 196. 
103 Conversely, women may be particularly vulnerable to being vilified as "soft on 
crime" and ousted from political life by pro-death penalty forces. See, e.g., John 
Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case 
Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 470-74 (1999) (discussing 
votes ousting former California Supreme Court Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird and 
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White); Mark Hansen, A Run for the 
Bench, 84 A.B.A. J. 68 (1998) (same). 
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no formal exclusions prevent women from public leadership, the 
deeply masculine imperative of capital punishment makes it an 
issue perhaps uniquely capable of policing women by returning 
women found too soft to the private sphere where femininity 
more easily resides. 
II 
GENDERING THE CONDEMNED 
The gendering of capital punishment is, of course, profoundly 
intertwined not only with the gender of those who carry it out, 
but also of those being punished. Capital punishment is usually 
men killing men. The biological sex may change without dislodg-
ing the masculinity of the operation; putting someone to death is 
masculine work, whoever does it. Being put to death is over-
whelmingly man's work too, but some women have been found 
fit for the role throughout history. Although the biological sex of 
the condemned prisoner is not determinative, the masculinity of 
the enterprise may be disrupted when the object of the execution 
is perceptibly and appropriately feminine, that is, a feminine fe-
male. Proper femininity is found more easily in White women 
than in women of color, in heterosexual women instead of lesbi-
ans, and in middle-class rather than poor women. However, this 
kind of profound and complex gender significance is largely hid-
den behind the current dominant version of gender equality 
under the law. 
Although gender is much more fluid and complex than a sim-
ple dichotomy of biological male or female, our law hides the 
messy complexities of gender behind the simple dualism of bio-
logical men and women, and the requirement of formal equality 
between the two. Thus, the legal issue of gender in the death 
penalty is popularly understood as the question of women on 
death row, and, more specifically, whether male and female capi-
tal defendants are treated the same. Although not the complete 
picture, those questions offer an apt starting place to consider the 
gender of the capital defendant. 
A. The Capital Critique of Formal Equality 
Through alignments of timing, the modern, post-Furman death 
penalty era has also been the era of formal gender equality, the 
principle by which our laws now struggle for coherence and con-
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trol over sex and gender.104 This looming legal standard, our of-
ficial story, contends that the state should treat women and men 
alike. The history of public opinion related to women being exe-
cuted does not establish a relentless march toward gender neu-
trality. In 1937, Gallop polls registered no difference in the level 
of support for the death penalty in general (fifty-eight percent) as 
for the death penalty imposed on women (also fifty-eight per-
cent).105 The same questions asked in 1953, shortly after the exe-
cution of Ethel Rosenberg,106 revealed that only seventy-five 
percent of the people who supported the death penalty in general 
supported it for women.107 By 1991, ninety-five percent of those 
who favored the death penalty for a "man convicted of murder" 
also favored it for a "woman convicted of mutder."108 The era of 
formal gender equality had arrived. 
Formal gender equality purports to promote equality by con-
ceiving of and producing gender as an individual attribute that 
can and should be isolated and ignored. As extensive feminist 
literature makes clear, formal equality uses the man as the stan-
dard for comparison,109 ignores the profound differences in the 
ways that women live, and thereby strengthens the power dispar-
ities that many feminists see at the core of gender rules yo Em-
brace of formal equality is one explanation for the persistent and 
104 Phyllis Crocker made this point in Feminism and Defending Men on Death 
Row, supra note 30, at 981-82. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), reinstated the 
death penalty in 1976. Leading cases finding that the Equal Protection Clause re-
quires formal gender equality included Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) 
and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See also Rapaport, Damned, supra note 
30, at 588 (noting the confluence of gender equality and post-Furman death penalty 
world). 
105 Ellsworth & Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes, supra note 18, at 38-39 (citing 
to Gallup polling that in 1937, fifty-eight percent of the population supported the 
death penalty for women and the same percentage supported the death penalty 
generally). 
106 Gross, Update, supra note 57, at 1465. That controversial execution of a wife 
and mother may have influenced public opinion in ways similar to the execution 
forty-five years later of Karla Faye Tucker. See infra text accompanying notes 172, 
197-99 (discussing impact on public opinion of Karla Faye Tucker's execution). 
107 In 1953, support for the death penalty generally had risen to sixty-eight per-
cent, but only fifty-one percent supported it for women. Ellsworth & Gross, Hard-
ening of the Attitudes, supra note 18. 
108 Gross, Update, supra note 57, at 1466 (showing that sixty-three percent an-
swered affirmatively about imposing the death penalty on a woman, compared to 
sixty-six percent in general). 
109 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSE ON LIFE 
AND LAW 34 (1987). 
110 For a generous partial rehabilitation of formal equality, see Mary Anne Case, 
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shallow association of feminist reform with retributive policies. I I I 
The isolation of gender hides differences among women, espe-
cially those related to class and race, such as the dramatically 
different arrest rates for White and African American women.112 
As many have suggested, formal equality has turned out to be 
best for women whose resumes are most like men's, and conse-
quently has hindered other women in custody battles for their 
children or maintenance of their standard of living after a di-
vorce. Formal gender equality has meant harsher sentences for 
women. II3 We seem comfortable upholding a vast gulf between 
the stated premises of formal equality of the law (men and wo-
men should be treated identically because they are the same) and 
the widespread culture of differences between the lives of men 
and women, including dramatic inequaiitiesP4 As Mary Anne 
Case suggests, "what [the Court] has required is not that the pro-
The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a 
Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (2000). 
III For criticism of feminist criminal justice policy reforms, see Dianne L. Martin, 
Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform Strate-
gies, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151 (1998). For a critique of damage wreaked by for-
mal gender equality in criminal law, see Britton, supra note 41, at 57. See generally 
Angela Davis & Gina Dent, Conversations: Prison as a Border: A Conversation on 
Gender, Globalization, and Punishment, 26 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'y 
1235 (2001). Angela Davis criticizes the impact of formal gender equality on women 
prisoners, decrying 
the strange but predictable way feminism has been embraced by custodial 
hierarchies. The demand for more women guards and high-level officers 
has been complemented by the demand to treat women prisoners the same 
as men prisoners. . .. Thus putatively feminist positions have bolstered the 
trend toward more repressive imprisonment practices for women and spe-
cifically the move from the cottage/campus architectural model to the con-
crete fortresses being constructed today. An interesting example of this 
feminism that demands formal equality of men and women prisoners is 
some wardens' insistence that women prisoners have the right to be consid-
ered every bit as dangerous as men. 
/d. at 1239. Further, a former woman warden successfully "lobbied for the right to 
shoot at women escapees." /d.; see also Meda Chesney-Lind & Joycelyn M. Pollock, 
Women's Prisons: Equality with a Vengeance, in WOMEN, LAW, AND SOCIAL CON-
TROL 155,167 (Alida V. Merlo & Joycelyn M. Pollock eds., 1995) (arguing that mak-
ing women's prisons more like men's was initially beneficial to the women prisoners 
but ultimately worsened their conditions of confinement). 
112 See, e.g., Britton, supra note 41, at 60 ("for some offenses ... arrest rates for 
African American women most closely match those for white men."). 
113 See Daly & Tonry, supra note 41, at 205. 
114 Our self-image of gender equality is quite a feat in an era when women 
still do eighty percent of childcare and two-thirds of the housework; when 
ninety-two percent of mothers do not work the kind of overtime required 
by many of the best jobs; when ninety-five percent of upper-level manage-
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tection be equal, but that the rule be the same."lI5 
Formal equality becomes incoherent when addressing suppos-
edly116 real biological differences between men and women (i.e., 
pregnancy, postpartum depression, menopause), but otherwise 
the rules for women and for men are supposed to be the same. 
Thus, the law is that sex is irrelevant in such areas as hiring, pun-
ishment, and benefits, except when it cannot be, because of biol-
ogyY7 This non-differentiation principle, or formal equality, is 
the rule through which courts judge capital cases, and the politi-
cal backdrop to decisions about clemency. In other words, for-
mal equality requires that, unless they are pregnant, women face 
the death penalty exactly as do men. The imbedded masculinity 
of capital punishment complicates this directive in multiple ways. 
B. "Warfare Writ Small" 
For all the militaristic rhetoric that surrounds criminal justice 
(i.e., "war on crime," "war on drugs"), the death penalty is the 
only domestic punishment in which killing is a deliberate policy. 
Therefore executions and warfare may share similarly deep-
seated yet false knowledge about manhood and womanhood. 
Our judges have not had the will to enforce formal gender 
equality in the important cultural performance of masculinity 
that is the military.lI8 A combat exclusion for women still exists, 
ment, and a similar percentage of the best blue-collar jobs, are held by 
men. 
Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work, Gen· 
der as Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1471 (2001). 
115 Case, supra note 110, at 1474. The gender neutrality of formal equality offers 
so little that we might follow Mary Anne Case in describing it instead as the norma-
tive principle that "sex should be irrelevant to an individual's treatment by the law." 
Id. at 1473. 
116 See, e.g., BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 21, at 6-7 (defining the gen-
der of sex itself). 
117 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding statutory distinction 
between foreign-born non-marital children of citizen fathers and those of citizen 
mothers on the basis of biological difference between fathers and mothers); Michael 
M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding statutory 
rape provision that applied only to males on the basis that females were sufficiently 
deterred by risk of pregnancy). 
118 For important commentary on the "maleness" of the military, see Martha 
Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 305 (1998); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the De-
segregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 501 (1991) [hereinafter 
Karst, Manhood]; see also Judith Gardam, Gender and Non-Combatant Immunity, 3 
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 345 (1993) (describing ways in which the law of 
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although it is much reduced, ll9 and the male-only registration of 
eighteen-year-olds for the draft has been upheld by the Supreme 
Court.120 What happened to the principle that men and women 
must be treated the same? Kenneth Karst has an answer: "Mas-
culinity is traditionally defined around the idea of power; the 
armed forces are the nation's preeminent symbol of power."121 
The exclusion of women from mandatory registration and 
some combat roles protects masculinities in the guise of protect-
ing women.122 Similar impulses may operate in capital punish-
ment; after all, "[c]apital punishment is warfare writ sma11."123 
Gender performance is contextual, fluid, and contingent; the 
masculinities in the death penalty undoubtedly disrupt the de-
mands of formal gender equality differently than do the mascu-
linities of war. For example, any comparison of gender in the 
military and in the death penalty requires determining the extent 
to which the military exclusions of women are designed to pre-
vent women from being killed, or to prevent women from being 
killers. The combat soldier embodies both those possibilities; 
capital punishment separates them, provoking the question 
whether the percentage of women executioners is any different 
armed combat is structured by a gendered distinction between combatants (mascu-
line warriors) and non-combatants (often understood to be women)}. 
119 See BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1104-06 (4th ed. 2000). 
120 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
121 Karst, Manhood, supra note 118, at 501. Wendy Williams provided a similar 
analysis: 
What does our culture identify as quintessentially masculine? Where is the 
locus of traditional masculine pride and self-identity? What can we iden-
tify in men's cultural experience that most divides it from women's cultural 
experience? Surely, one rather indisputable answer to that question is 
"war": physical combat and its modern equivalents. 
Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections On Culture, Courts, and 
Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 183 (1982). For proof of the cultural anxi-
ety about emasculation of the military, see STEPHANIE GUTMANN, THE KINDER, 
GENTLER MILITARY: CAN AMERICA'S GENDER-NEUTRAL FIGHTING FORCE STILL 
WIN WARS (2000); see also Mark M. Hager, C.I. Jane and the Limits of Liberalism, 
10 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 221 (2000) (using Gutmann's work as a 
platform for "reflection on the relationships of equality, sex roles, military issues, 
and social control in a liberal society"). 
122 Karst, Women, supra note 8, at 624 (quoting Michael Wright, The Marine 
Corps Faces the Future, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 16,74 (quot-
ing General Robert H. Barrow». One former Commandant of the Marines ex-
plained that allowing women in combat "tramples the male ego. When you come 
right down to it, you have to protect the manliness of war." Id. 
123 Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitu-
tion, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1764 (1987). 
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from the percentage of women who are on death row.124 
Significantly, the combat exclusion is a categorical exclusion 
from a certain kind of employment. The gender-based draft re-
gistration of eighteen-year-old men is a formal, categorical, posi-
tive law exemption of young women from an important duty to 
our country. Women's inclusion among the condemned is not 
barred by a similar structure of transparent and explicit categori-
cal exclusions, but instead is controlled by facially neutral yet 
gendered eligibility statutes and isolated, discretionary determi-
nations of individuals working the death penalty machinery. Wil-
liam Buckley's proposal notwithstanding,125 the public does not 
want a formal exemption to prevent executions of women, per-
haps because convicted murderers do not receive the same level 
of protection as eighteen-year-old daughters of all races and clas-
ses, and perhaps because the informal discretionary mechanisms 
are sufficient to protect the masculinity of the death penalty. 
Even without any formal exclusion of women, death row is over-
whelmingly male. 
C. The Masculinist Cycle of Male Killing Male 
Death row today is filled with 3717126 nameless, faceless men. 
Males arrested for murder are six times more likely to be sen-
tenced to death than females arrested for murder.127 We see gen-
der more easily in the cases of women on death row,128 but 
124 In the film Monster's Ball, one of the execution team is a woman. Her· job, 
checking the identifications of the witnesses, positions her with the witnesses, not 
the participants, and Hank checks to make sure that she is alright. MONSTER'S 
BALL, supra note 77. Ivan Solotoroff's recent book about executioners does not 
mention any women executioners. See IVAN SOLOTAROFF, THE LAST FACE YOU'LL 
EVER SEE: THE PRIVATE LIFE OF THE AMERICAN DEATH' PENALTY (2001). 
125 See William F. Buckley, Jr., Miss Tucker's Plea, NAT'L REV.; Mar. 9, 1998, at 
71 (discussing the "quite understandable reluctance to execute women" but finding 
that "revival of the idea of special protection contends against the tidal wave of 
equality"). Buckley has recommended that we borrow from the combat exclusion a 
formal exclusion from executions in order to avoid the "terribly taxing" reality of 
pleas based on sex from each of the women on death row. [d. In suggesting a 
formal immunity, Buckley is (probably unwittingly) borrowing from the former So-
viet and current Russian capital punishment regimes. 
126 Death Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 3. 
127 Streib, Gendering, supra note 5, at 442. 
128 Cf Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S 
LJ. 76, 86 (2000). 
Generally speaking, men do not perceive themselves to be en-gendered. 
Gender, for men, is a term that relates to women and women's experiences; 
it is synonymous with "female." Thus, men have not paid much attention 
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gender is just as powerful a force, maybe a more powerful force, 
in the cases of all the men, who sit ondeath rqw . . ' 
Manliness can be established by bettering other men.129 The 
crimes considered most worthy of the death penalty are the 
crimes of men. Elizabeth Rapaport argues convincingly that the 
main explanation for the maleness of death row is choices about 
which crimes merit death: "It is the extremely low rate of partici-
pation in death penalty echelon crimes that most powerfully ex-
plains the low percentage of women on death roW."130 The 
choice to execute men has not been enacted by statutes limiting 
the death penalty to serial killers, most of whom are White 
men,131 but is instead grounded in the legislative policy to expand 
the scope of capital murders to the category that includes the 
majority of first degree murders, felony murder.132 The vast ma-
jority of felony murders, such as the killing of a person behind 
the counter in a convenience store robbery, are committed by 
men, not by women. The inclusion of felony murders within 
death penalty statutes almost guarantees that most condemned 
are men. 
Death-eligibility choices are, of course, themselves deeply 
gendered. Men and women commit different murders; the felony 
murders of men are the highest percentage of capital cases; the 
domestic murders that women commit generally are not consid-
ld. 
to the ways in which the social constructions of gender shape and define 
men's experiences as men. 
129 Harris, supra note 10, at 779-80. ("Exploration of the violence in the criminal 
justice system-the violence of both private and public actors-begins to reveal the 
extent to which masculine identity is shaped by relations of repulsion and desire 
between men."). 
130 Rapaport, Damned, supra note 30, at 583; Rapaport, Domestic Discount, 
supra note 30; Rapaport, Gender Discrimination, supra note 30. 
131 See Jack Levin & James Alan Fox, Female Serial Killers, in FEMALE CRIMI-
NALITY: THE STATE OF THE ART 249, 250 (Concetta C. Culliver ed., 1993) ("lYpi-
cally, serial killers are white males in their late 20's or 30's .... "); but see Candice 
Skrapec, The Female Serial Killer: An Evolving Criminality, in MOVING TARGETS: 
WOMEN, MURDER AND REPRESENTATIONS 241, 243 (Helen Birch ed., 1994) (sug-
gesting that women account for close to the same percentage of serial murders as of 
murder (twelve to fifteen percent)). 
132 See Rapaport, Domestic Discount, supra note 30, at 510 (supporting claim that 
seventy-five percent of capital murders are felony murders); Steven F. Shatz & Nina 
Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1283 (1997) (discussing impact of making felony murders death-eligible, 
thereby making most murders death eligible). 
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ered death-worthy.133 The fact that domestic murders are not 
punished as severely as other murders means that many people 
who kill women are not considered as blameworthy as other 
murderers, given that women are over-represented as victims of 
domestic murders.134 Gender operates in these assessments of 
which categories of murders are considered most terrible, but the 
low number of women on death row does not itself create some 
sort of prima facie case of prosecutorial discrimination against 
men in application of the capital statutes; rather, the gender bias 
is built into the statutes. 
The relative infrequency with which women are sentenced to 
death does not constitute evidence of discrimination against men. 
Executions of women transgress taboos against certain kinds of 
public violence against women,135 but even that reluctance is not 
offered to all women. We take care of some women, some of the 
time. Wanda Jean Allen's life, and most of Karla Faye Tucker's, 
were themselves dramatic refutation of the idea that women are 
protected by chivalry, placed on a pedestal, or taken care ofP6 
Most of the women charged with capital murder are not suffi-
ciently feminine-because of poverty, mental illness, race, or the 
violent agency of the crime of which they are accused, to earn the 
full protection of womanhood through informal immunity from 
being charged as capital defendants.137 
133 Rapaport, Domestic Discount, supra note 30. 
134 [d. at 1512. . 
135 Heberle, supra note 30, at 1103. ("While the state-sanctioned killing of wo-
men has yet to be normalized, women's bodies as sexualized objects have been re-
garded as the appropriate targets of extralegal violence and as undeserving of the 
full protections of the state."). 
136 Wanda Jean Allen, a poor, African American lesbian executed by Oklahoma 
in 2001, and Kayla Faye Tucker are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 166-
67,178. 
137 But see Streib, Gendering, supra note 5; Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Before the 
Law: Men, Women, and the Death Penalty, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 
427 (2000). 
At any rate, the Court's refusal to engage a race discrimination claim without 
evidence of intent to discriminate specific to a particular case seems to foreclose 
successful gender attacks based on statistical evidence. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279 (1987). Indeed, Justice Powell explicitly rejected the race claim in part 
because it could also invite "even" gender claims. [d. at 317. That is, one reason to 
block claims of systemic race discrimination was to foreclose claims of systemic gen-
der discrimination. 
Although Constitutional law draws us into such comparisons, analogies between 
gender and race are rarely useful. Such comparisons oversimplify both race and 
gender, reinforcing the false notion that they are separate, and the equally false 
notion that they somehow have equivalent meanings, histories, or contexts. See STE-
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Women charged with capital murder might have earned pun-
ishment through gender transgression in addition to the formali-
ties of the crimes for which they have been convicted.138 Some 
women on death row seem to represent the gender transgres-
sions of a woman appropriating male roles. Karla Faye Tucker, 
who gloried in the sexual excitement of her pickaxe killings, 
seemed to fit that category. Other women embody the danger of 
a stereo typically female role gone bad, such as the many women 
on death row who killed their husbands (dangerous wives)139 and 
mothers who killed their children (bad mothers).14o 
Although the number of women on death row is so small that 
virtually nothing in terms of verifiable social science data is possi-
ble, we can see a growing number of women on death row be-
cause of killing children. Dangerous wives and bad mothers 
embody twisted versions of a symbolically female role. If execu-
tions generally are a sign of taking control over social disorder, 
PHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UN-
DERMINES AMERICA 85-102 (1996). Even if they could be separated, the meanings 
of race and gender in criminal justice would be spectacularly asymmetrical. See 
Daly & Tonry, supra note 41. In addition, our public rhetoric of gender is very 
different from that of race. Sex can be noticed and spoken of in ways that race is 
not. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (" 'Inherent differences' 
between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebra-
tion."); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reI. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994), J. O'Connor, con-
curring ("one need not be a sexist to share the intuition that in certain cases a 
person's gender and resulting life experiences will be relevant to his or her view of 
the case."); see also Carri Geer Thevenot, Women Convicted of Killing Stepdaughter 
Sentenced to Life in Prison, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 21, 2002, at B1 (expressly 
comparing the three female defendants he had sentenced for homicide, sentencing 
judge declared this defendant "the worst of the lot"). This willingness to express 
rather than silence gendered comparisons might help to reveal the evidence of inten-
tional gender bias operating in an specific case apparently required by McCleskey. 
To make a discrimination claim on behalf of a male capital defendant, the sex of the 
defendant would have to be noteworthy and commented upon. But such comments 
are highly unlikely, because the sex and gender of most capital defendants is as 
unremarkable as the fact that the receptionist is a young woman. Most capital de-
fendants are simply more men, in a sea of men. 
138 See Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9, at 402. See generally Jenny E. Carroll, 
Note, Images of Women and Capital Sentencing Among Female Offenders: Explor-
ing the Outer Limits of the Eighth Amendment and Articulated Theories of Justice, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 1413 (1997) (discussing death penalty for transgressive women). 
139 Professor Victor Streib reports that thirteen women who killed their husbands 
are currently on death row, five of whom have been sentenced in the last four years. 
Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female Offenders; January 1, 1973, Through June 
30, 2002, at 3, at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/femdeath.htm (July 26, 2002) 
[hereinafter Report: 1973-2002]. 
140 Ten women are on death row for killing their children, four of whom were 
sentenced in the last four years. Id. 
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executing these women might be understood as a gesture of tak-
ing control over gender disorder.141 Even if most of the violence 
of capital punishment is masculinities against masculinities, the 
gender neutral legal regimen allows the execution of these partic-
ularly violent versions of womanhood. Or, perhaps, the docility 
of wives and the self-sacrifice of mothers is so essential to those 
roles that the deadly crimes render the condemned fundamen-
tally masculine wives and mothers, that is, not really wives or 
mothers at all. 
These questions are· entwined with the gendered nature of 
agency al!d autonomy. Capital punishment ratifies and rein-
forces the message that individuals are responsible for their ac-
tions. To the extent that capital punishment is supported on the 
basis of notions of just desserts and retribution, the desired mes-
sage is that people are responsible and therefore will be pun-
ished.142 Women on death row undermine that theme, to the 
extent that they are feminine subjects who are not understood to 
be free, autonomous agents.143 "Punishment ... involves imagin-
ing the object of vengeance to be a responsible agent who de-
serves whatever he gets, and, at the same time, a dangerous 
monster with whom we must deal."144 Although feminine "mon-
sters" are well-established in our cultural histories and personal 
psychologies, the notion of "responsible agency" is deeply mas-
culine. Are real wives and mothers understood to be free and 
autonomous? Issues about executing women raise complex 
problems, both de-stablizing and stablizing regimens of capital 
141 Renee Heberle makes this point: 
Society wonders whether women; as women, need to be rendered more 
commonly subject to the disciplinary sanctions of the state, not in the name 
of equality but in the name of managing the disorder engendered by une-
qual relations of power. The concern about women's immunity from soci-
ety's worst sanction might be taken, accordingly, to indicate that other 
forms of disciplining women are perceived as no longer adequate. 
Heberle, supra note 30, at 1104. 
142 "Capital punishment, after all, construes the condemned as having the will and 
capacities proper to human beings." Norton, supra note 75, at 36. 
143 On women's agency, see Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Femi-
nist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1999); Kathryn 
Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995). 
144 Austin Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment: Responsibility and 
Representation in Dead Man Walking and Last Dance, in THE KILLING STATE, 
supra note 60, at 227, 239 [hereinafter Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capital Punish-
ment] (citing WILLIAM CONNOLLY, THE ETHOS OF PLURALIZATION 47 (1995». 
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punishment.145 Women on death row embody the conflict be-
tween formal equality of our legal system, and deep-seated cul-
tural understandings of what it is to be a man and what it is to be 
a woman. 
Interestingly, as Elizabeth Rapaport has pointed out, bias in 
favor of women is suggested by the rates of leaving death row, 
whether by appellate reversaP46 or clemency.147 As to reversible 
error on appeal, Rapaport suggests that "[h]igh as the incidence 
of reversible error was found to be in death cases generally, it is 
possible that the error rate in female death cases is higher 
sti11."148 She posits that the relative rarity of women on death 
row might give their cases the particular scrutiny reserved for 
noteworthy cases, and suggests that further research may show 
that women tend to benefit more than men from proportionality 
review because women are less severe aggravators with fewer 
prior crimes of violence.149 Regarding clemency, Rapaport 
shows that women have received a disproportionately high num-
ber of the post-Furman, merit-based grants of clemency-seven 
of forty-four. 150 
These numbers are not surprising. Harmlessness is more easily 
discoverable in women than in men; violent crimes are more eas-
ily understood as aberrational,151 so redemption can be more 
easily seen. Women are more easily understood, by themselves 
and others, as victims.152 Especially to the extent that mitigation 
evidence suggests victimhood, women facing death sentences 
might be more willing to allow such evidence to be investigated 
145 The underlying message of responsibility and control is, of course, provoked 
by and in constant tension with the experience of powerlessness that fuels the desire 
for the death penalty. 
146 Professor Rapaport uses the Liebman Study of error rates in capital cases, 
1973-1995. See Rapaport, Staying Alive, supra note 30, at 976 n.38 (citing to James 
S. Liebman et aI., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, at 
http://justice.policy.net/jpreportlfinrep.PDF (Mar. 13, 2001)). 
147 Rapaport, Damned, supra note 30, at 583-88; Rapaport, Staying Alive, supra 
note 30, at 976-84; see also LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at xiii (describing 
clemency granted by conservative Alabama Governor Fob James to a woman con-
victed of a particularly gruesome crime). 
148 Rapaport, Staying Alive, supra note 30, at 979. 
1491d. at 979-80. 
150ld. at 981. 
151 Cf Britton, supra note 41, at 60. 
152 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Stanko, Warnings to Women: Police Advice and Wo-
men's Safety in Britain, in CRIME CONTROL AND WOMEN, supra note 59, at 52 
(describing particular consequences of association between women and 
victimization ). 
Executing White Masculinities 215 
and revealed.1s3 To the extent that women are less likely to sus-
tain the impression of being fully responsible for their acts, they 
are more likely to be removed from death row. And perhaps 
appellate courts and governors are able to act more like protec-
tive fathers,ls4 further removed from the shocking and frighten-
ing crime for which the woman has been condemned. In short, 
feminine subjects will clean up better for the appellate and clem-
ency processes. We should not be surprised that the lottery of 
selection for execution might disfavor those who most easily sus-
tain the masculinity of the enterprise. 
Every female and male defendant is considered within unspo-
ken but powerful constructions of masculinities and femininities. 
Condemned women have forsaken their femininity, or perhaps 
never had it, and thereby lose their claim to life.lss Men who are 
on death row need to be punished precisely because of their mas-
culine identity, wrapped up as it is with their class and racial 
identities, chosen and imposed.1s6 Men on death row rarely 
transgress their gender assignments.IS? If anything, they are con-
demned for embodying frighteningly fierce maSCUlinity, provok-
ing condemnation especially from other, different, men.lss The 
uneasiness with executing more women may be because capital 
153 See Streib, Gendering, supra note 5, at 463 (decisionmakers might more easily 
find sympathetic factors for women than for men, perhaps because women might be 
less reluctant to expose these factors). 
154 Mary Ellen Gale has identified "the patriarchal norm that assigns the task of 
serious punishment both within and outside the family to persons acting as fathers 
rather than mothers." Gale, supra note 41, at 737 n.194. Is the appellate court more 
like a forgiving father? See Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1405-21 
(describing "male" quality of judges contrasted with "female" juries). Perhaps clem-
ency is an unusual amalgamation of feminine caring (mercy) with masculine author-
ity. If so, the recent relative rarity of clemency grants may suggest a resurgence in 
the masculine discipline of capital punishment. See Rapaport, Staying Alive, supra 
note 30, at 967; see also Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Op-
eration of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1501, 1506-07 (describing the 
"timorous executive" of today's explanations for reluctance to use clemency power). 
155 See Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9; see also Heberle, supra note 30, at 
1106. 
156 See generally Howarth, Black Male innocence, supra note 13, at 102-08 (dis-
cussing imposed and chosen identities, and links between them). 
IS? An important exception is gay men, whose gender transgressions can put them 
at risk for a death sentence. See, e.g., Missouri v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 
1987). 
158 Heberle, supra note 30, at 1105-06 ("When men commit violence in the private 
sphere, they are in a sense fulfilling the grim assumptions society holds about mascu-
linity. They do not have to be remasculinized to be considered redeemable or 
'human.' Instead, judgment turns on whether they took their masculinity too far."). 
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punishment is centrally about asserting, proving, and re-enacting 
masculinities. In other words, changing the gender identity of 
the person being executed changes the gender of the execu-
tioner159 and of the execution. 
If the death penalty consists mainly of gender violence of men 
against men, feminine capital defendants who are women may 
disrupt the meaning and power of the system. If executions are 
mainly about taking some control over perceived lawlessness, the 
person being executed has to have the qualities of being frighten-
ing and relatively easily de-humanized. Race, of course, is highly 
relevant to both of these characteristics. Race matters; class mat-
ters; gender matters. Feminine subjects, not female bodies, con-
fuse and disarm the symbolic machinery of death. To make 
appropriately condemned, women need to have lost their femi-
ninity, whether through subordinated status or through their 
actions. 
These gendered tensions are manifested in the life or death 
determination in each individual capital case. 
D. The Impossibility of Gender Neutral 
Individualized Consideration 
The fact that there are so many ways to be a woman-and 
some females who are not even recognized as women-does not 
suggest the casualness or unimportance of gender, but instead 
proves the opposite, the need for powerful symbols and rein-
forcement of our identities. We live our own lives and we judge 
others as performances of gender, or proof of gender. Thus, gen-
der is a constant struggle, and the decision whether to execute a 
capital defendant is in part a judgment about gender. 
Capital cases are structured by a series of highly discretionary 
decisions leading to life or death.160 The individualized sentenc-
159 For example, Alexander Cockburn stated that "Bush Jr. proved he was man 
enough to kill a woman." Alexander Cockburn, A Day for the 'Hang 'em' Ghouls, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1998, at B9; see Streib, Gendering, supra note 5, at 34 ("To 
bolster their manliness, they need to dispatch the toughest of male opponents; ... 
executing a woman does not give them that masculine rush. To the contrary, it 
stains them as 'guys who hit girls,' the ultimate wimps on the playground."); see also 
THE GREEN MILE (Castle Rock Entertainment 1999) (film in which White execu-
tioner played by Tom Hanks is transformed by saintly condemned African Ameri-
can man). 
160 For a discussion of the gender in the guided discretion of capital cases, see 
Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5, at 1364-81. 
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ing required by Woodson v. North Carolina 161 and Lockett v. 
Ohio 162 mandates that each . defendant be' judged as a unique 
human being, in light of his or her entire life experience, and that 
no one's crimes require a death sentence. Is this a person who 
deserves to live? Or is this person too dangerous to live? Is this 
even a person, or an animal?163 Unlike an employment, housing, 
or school admission decision, the entire life of the person can be 
scrutinized. At trial the worthiness or culpability of the accused 
is not formally compared with anyone else's, except perhaps the 
victim's. The law provides no right answer. 
This discretion, at charging, penalty phase, appellate level, 
post-conviction stages, and clemency invites the social impulses, 
biases, and other forms of socially constructed knowledge to 
shape the narrowing process from death-eligible to executed. In 
the penalty phase, we literally judge the value of a life, compar-
ing the value of the defendant's life with the value of the victim's, 
already lost. The extraordinary discretion provided to deci-
sionmakers in capital cases leaves the gendered symbolic power 
of capital punishment unrestrained. 
In this life, we notice everybody's sex and gender. That is, 
often the first things }Ve see about the person is whether a person 
is male and recognizably and appropriately masculine, or female 
and recognizably and appropriately feminine. We do not have 
the capacity to ignore sex and gender in any kind of encounter, 
unless it is rendered invisible because it is so ordinary. So, for 
example, we do not necessarily notice that a receptionist is a wo-
man; we would notice if she was a man, particularly an older, 
distinguished man. How then; when it comes to judging a life, in 
a capital case, could sex and gender not matter? 
The foolish inadequacy of attempting t6 safeguard against dis-
crimination by ignoring sex or gender can be seen in the federal 
instruction and verdict certificate designed to eradicate sex or 
gender bias in federal capital decisionmaking. The jury is in-
structed that the sex of the defendant cannot be considered, and 
that "the jury is not to recommend a sentence of death unless it 
has concluded that it would recommend a sentence of death for 
161 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
162 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Death penalty schemes must enable consideration of 
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604. 
163 See Howarth, Black Male Innocence, supra note 13, at 136-38 (describing 
racialized animals analogies in capital cases). 
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the crime in question no matter what the ... sex of the defen-
dant."164 As part of the verdict, each juror must supply a certifi-
cate pledging that he or she did not consider the sex (or any 
other prohibited characteristic) of the offender.165 Imagine the 
difficulty of applying this formula in Karla Faye Tucker's case. 
Karla Faye Tucker was brought into prostitution as a child by her 
mother, and began taking drugs at age eight.166 She dreamt of 
being the first female quarterback in the National Football 
League. At the age of ten, her older sister's boyfriend provided 
her first heroin injection in the hope of sex. Like her mother, 
Karla Faye Tucker learned to sell sex for money, drugs, and inde-
pendence. Or consider Wanda Jean Allen, executed by 
Oklahoma in 2001 for killing her woman lover. The jury that 
condemned Wanda Jean Allen was told that she was the man in 
the family.167 What would it mean to disregard her life as a wo-
man? With whom could she be compared? 
Imagine a jury asked to consider Andrea Yates without taking 
into account her sex.168 Andrea Yates, the Texan who faced a 
death sentence for drowning her five children, has drawn ex-
164 18 U.S.c. § 3593(f) (1994). 
165 [d. Victor Streib advocates using this or a similar Instruction to minimize sex 
bias in state capital cases. Streib, Gendering, supra note 5. 
166 For a compelling account of Karla Faye Tucker's life, see BEVERLY LOWRY, 
CROSSED OVER: A MURDER, A MEMOIR (1992). These descriptions of Karla Faye 
Tucker's life are derived from this work; see also Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9 
(describing Tucker's life). 
167 See Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79, 95 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert denied, 513 U.S. 
952 (1994). For a description of Wanda Jean Allen's case, see Michael B. Shortnacy, 
Comment, Guilty and Gay, A Recipe for Execution in American Courtrooms: Sexual 
Orientation as a Tool for Prosecution of Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 51 AM. 
U.L. REV. 309, 341-44 (2001). 
168 Patricia J. Williams, Beyond the Village Pale, NATION, July 16, 2001, at 9 ("But 
the Yates case revealed a deep gender divide about the isolation and stress of family 
and motherhood in a society that extols self-sufficiency as its premiere human 
value."); see also Anna Quindlen, Playing God on No Sleep, NEWSWEEK, July 2, 
2001, at 64. 
Every mother I've asked about the Yates case has the same reaction. She's 
appalled; she's aghast. And then she gets this look. And the look says that 
at some forbidden level she understands. The looks says that there are two 
very different kinds of horror here. There is the unimaginable idea of the 
killings. And then there is the entirely imaginable idea of going quietly 
bonkers in the house with five kids under the age of 7. 
[d. The fierce difficulty of mothering is not acceptable to acknowledge. "So that 
when someone does something as horrifying as what Andrea Yates did, there is no 
room for even a little bit of understanding." Anna Picard, Could You Too be a 
Killer Mummy?, N. STATESMAN, July 9, 2001, at 29. "In Houston, there is little 
liberal sympathy for a woman seen as having so many blessings. To many, Yates has 
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traordinary public interest. The excitement might have related to 
her position as a White, college-educated, middle class woman. 
Andrea Yates' case riveted in part because she embodied con-
flictif.1g positions in our culture wars. Anti-feminists ridiculed 
compassion for Yates,169 a fundamentalist Christian, anti-abor-
tion, capital defendant whose crimes were bound up with home 
schooling and relentless motherhood. In formal legal terms, as-
sessing the appropriateness of a death verdict against Andrea 
Yates should have been easy; mental illness reduces culpability. 
Under a regime of supposed gender-blind equality, however, the 
gendered source of her psychosis, post-partum depression, con-
fused this simple truth, as if recognizing the mitigation in a 
mental illness unique to women would mean impermissibly 
favoring women. The cultural meaning of Andrea Yates' crime is 
confused because her terrible crimes can be attributed to the 
pressures of her life as a wife and mother. 170 Could any honest 
person evaluating the case of Andrea Yates sign a certificate such 
as that now required in federal capital cases171 verifying that the 
sex of the defendant was not considered in the sentencing? The 
gender-blind regime of formal equality obscures truths about wo-
men's lives while inviting unrestrained and unacknowledged atti-
tudes about gender to impact life or death decisions. 
Karla Faye Tucker's execution changed popular support for 
destroyed the precious illusion that such murders are the province of poverty or 
evil." Id. 
Id. 
In sex- and war-torn America, mothers who kill are seen as "getting away 
with it" .... America is tired of the "hormonal" defense. It sounds too 
menstrual, irrational, and self-indulgent. The feminists don't like it be-
cause it implies that women cannot think when they are bleeding or lactat-
ing. The "feminazi-haters" don't like it because it reminds them of their 
mothers. 
169 E.g., Ann Coulter, Stop Persecuting Andrea Yates!!!, HUMAN EVENTS, Sept. 
10,2001, at 5 (satirical parody of supposed National Organization for Women letter 
of support for Andrea Yates). 
170 The complexities of knowing whether a woman is being helped or hurt by her 
female identities can be seen in the public polling that showed forty-four percent of 
the people polled supported execution of Andrea Yates, compared with seventy-
eight percent for Timothy McVeigh. The willingness of so many Americans to sup-
port death for a mentally ill Andrea Yates--where even the Houston prosecutor told 
the jury that death was not required--is chilling. Paul, supra note 90, at 22 (forty-
four percent polled by Gallop supported execution of Andrea Yates, compared to 
sixty-two percent for Juan Raul Garza and seventy-eight percent for Timothy 
McVeigh). 
171 See 18 U.S.c. § 3593(f). 
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the death penalty in this country,l72 yet her execution has been 
followed by six executions of women,173 none of which caused 
any nationaP74 outcry, discomfort, or even much notice. If gen-
der matters, how can the executions of Judy Buenoano, Betty 
Lou Beets, Christina Riggs, Wanda Jean Allen, Marilyn Plantz, 
and Lois Nadean Smith be explained? The explanation lies in 
remembering that biological sex by. itself explains very little. 
Gender is more than biology, and gender does not exist as sepa-
rate from race or class or sexual identity.175 At least in this 
world, a woman without a race cannot exist, so gender is not sep-
arate from race.176 The gender identities continuously imposed 
on and created by a professional Black woman are very different 
from the gender identities or expectations imposed upon a poor 
White woman. A speech about capital punishment entitled "The 
Black Man's Burden"177 describes particular, highly contextual 
manifestations of the meanings of African American manhood. 
The fact that gender identities are not identical-in fact are 
172 See, e.g., Paul, supra note 90, at 22 (identifying the execution of Karla Faye 
Tucker as one of the reasons .for a reversal in 1998 of what had been thirty-years of 
steady increases in . support for the death penalty and citing April 2001 poll con-
ducted by ABC News and the Washington Post that found a majority of Americans 
(fifty-one percent) supported a moratorium on the death penalty). 
173 See Streib, Report: 1973-2001, supra note 139, at 4-5. 
174 Outcry did occur in other countries. For example, "[a]n average person in 
France could not help but be familiar with the case of Betty Lou Beets." Suzanne 
Daley, Europeans Deplore Executions in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at A8. 
175 See, e.g. , Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241 (1991) 
(describing intersections of gender and race); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet 
Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Dis-
course, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 561, 641 (1997) (emphasizing inseparability and mul-
tidimensionality of race, gen<;ler, and sexuality); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the 
Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1275-76, 1280 (1997) (emphasiz-
ing complex ways that race, gender, and sexuality constitute each other). 
171f part of what it means to be a woman is not to be sentenced to death, the 
womanhood of those who were executed was invisible before the law. That 
the majority of women,who have been executed were Black reveals that 
the protection of womanhood was really the protection of white woman-
hood. Barbara Smith explains that "[w]hen you read about Black women 
being lynched, they aren't thinking of us as females. The horrors that we 
have experienced have, absolutely everything to do with them not even 
viewing us as women." 
Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9, at 417 (quoting Barbara Smith, as quoted in ELIZ-
ABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST 
THOUGHT 37 (1988)). 
177 See Charles J . .ogletree, Jr., Black Man's Burden: Race and the Death Penalty 
in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 115 (2002). 
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hugely different from one man to another or from one woman to 
another-does not· make them less powerful as constraints or 
pressures on the material and imaginable choices of either wo-
men or men. Just the opposite is true. 
Consider, for example, the gender of Karla Faye Tucker, when 
executed by Texas in 1998, and the gender of Wanda Jean Allen, 
one of three women executed by Oklahoma in 2001.178 Karla 
Faye Tucker was a White, articulate, charming, sweet, a~tractive, 
devoutly heterosexual (married to a minister) woman. Wanda 
Jean Allen was also religious, but her Christian identity was un-
dercut by her lesbianism. Wanda Jean Allen was an African 
American lesbian, described in her trial as "the man in the rela-
tionship." She was convicted and sentenced to die for killing her 
lover in a domestic dispute. Allen and her partner were both 
African American women who had met in prison while serving 
homicide sentences. 
We know that many Americans did not have the stomach for 
the execution of an attractive, articulate, white, married (hetero-
sexual), Christian woman. To add the modifiers is not to dilute 
the importance of "woman"; the reaction to Karla Faye Tucker 
does not make sense except as a reaction to a woman. The public 
has not been interested in the many decent and likeable men on 
death row who have transformed their lives through religious 
conversion.179 
However, as Simone de Beauvoir famously advised us, women 
are made, not born. Race, class, attractiveness, and gender-ap-
propriate behavior make the woman, not biology. Karla Faye 
Tucker herself understood that no one would have recognized 
her as a woman at the time of her crime.180 Although we have 
too little social science data on the women of death row, one 
study suggests that "death-sentenced women of color and lesbi-
ans are over-represented in the kinds of murders that, according 
178 For a compelling account of Karla Faye Tucker, see Beverly Lowry, The Good 
Bad Girl, N. YORKER, Feb. 9, 1998, at 60. Wanda Jean Allen is the subject of a 
powerful documentary film, The Execution of Wanda Jean (HBO 2002). See also 
Allen v. Oklahoma, 871 P.2d 79, 104-05, J. Lane, dissenting (dissenting from major-
ity conclusion finding probative evidence that Allen was "man" in the relationship). 
179 See, e.g. , LlFroN & MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 224. "Men who find religion 
and lead decent lives on death row still carry with them the implicit threat of their 
maleness." Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9, at 415. 
180 "Had you seen me fourteen years ago, you wouldn't have called me a woman." 
60 Minutes, Woman on Death Row Gets Support for the Christian Community (CBS 
television broadcast, Dec. 7, 1997) (Karla Faye Tucker to Leslie Stahl). 
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to prior research, are at low risk of resulting in the death pen-
alty."181 Executing women who transgress feminine norms helps 
to reaffirm those traditional norms of womanhood in the face of 
pressures, including those of feminism.182 
Thus, gender is neither simple nor static. It is complex and 
contingent; it can be lost. That is, some females are not seen as 
women just as some males are not understood to be real men. We 
cannot talk about gender without talking about race, class, age, 
and other qualities. The gender-blind version of formal gender 
equality, of course, sees none of those individual characteristics 
or any others beyond biological assignment as male or female. 183 
A narrow and simplistic focus on sex-executing some women 
-will not de-stabilize capital punishment. Indeed, the focus on 
women on death row helps to legitimize capital punishment. 
When executions are in danger of being too routine to muster 
much interest,184 any noteworthy executions help to sustain the 
power of the death penalty. By being exceptional,185 women on 
death row fortify the death penalty system by reminding us of the 
individual cases, the horrible crimes, and our justification for 
vengeance.186 More particularly, if imposing death is understood 
as performing a difficult duty, overcoming discomfort and apply-
181 Kathryn Ann Farr, Aggravating and Differentiating Factors in the Cases of 
White and Minority Women on Death Row, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 260 (1997). 
182 See Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9; see also Kaufman-Osborn, Introduc-
tion, supra note 30, at 1100. 
183 See, e.g., Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 1122. 
If a liberal regime is to make good on its promise of formal equality, if its 
justice is to be truly blind, the body caught up within its legal complex must 
become an abstraction, a being stripped all of the differentiating features 
that make it this body rather than that one. 
Id.; cf Joan W. Howarth, First and Last Chance: Looking for Lesbians in Fifties Bar 
Cases, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 153 (1995) (discussing loss of rights 
when courts confronted specific differentiating features of gay men and lesbians). 
184 Sentencing is a signifying practice of some importance. Garland, supra note 
38, at 200. "The importance of the communication-and the fact that it is a commu-
nication-is dramatically highlighted if the symbolic message that it contains is un-
expected or in some way controversial." Id. at 199. 
185 Rapaport, Damned, supra note 30 (discussing the salience of women on death 
row). 
186 Samuel Gross explains the public preference for very few actual executions in 
part because of the need to notice each execution: 
A single execution is not truly an act of revenge but it looks like revenge, it 
symbolizes our desire and our willingness to seek vengeance. When we 
single out one murderer we can focus on what he did to deserve death. But 
if we were to conduct a hundred executions in close order we would lose 
any illusion of individual vengeance; all we would see is mass killing by the 
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ing the law "fairly" by executing women helps to legitimize capi-
tal punishment. Under an inoculation theory, we need to 
execute some women to prove that gender is not a considera-
tion.187 (In what other public debate are we concerned with fair-
ness to the condemned? Is this another manifestation of the 
expendability of women?) 
We might even understand that executing women can rein-
force the masculinity of the death penalty, in reaction. In her 
study of the Los Angeles Police Department, Janis Appier sug-
gests that the presence of women as police officers had the para-
doxical effect of masculinizing the police department; since the 
1970's, police forces have become much more masculine, leaving 
behind the greater service orientation of earlier eras, when of-
ficers performed caring tasks, including assisting children and 
homeless people.188 The renewed masculinity of capital punish-
ment in the face of executions of women may relate to an anx-
ious backlash, reasserting the masculinist power of executions in 
the face of apparent weakness in killing women. Or, more di-
rectly, perhaps the direct masculinist impulse of undertaking the 
duty of disciplining women who have gone too far is quite consis-
tent with the masculinist impulse to vanquish other men. 
The death penalty is relentlessly aimed at poor people, and 
death judgments protect White lives. If the death penalty regime 
is so successful at targeting those subordinated by class and race, 
why not by sex? Perhaps even better than other spheres of pub-
lic life, crime and punishment prove the impossibility of attempt-
ing to separate race, class, and gender and. then draw 
comparisons between them. Race and gender in criminal justice 
are spectacularly asymmetrica1.189 Renee Heberle has suggested 
that private violence against women fulfills the subordination 
function against women that executions fulfill against poor men, 
state, slaughter. The symbolism would change; the issue would now be the 
nature of our society, our culture. 
Gross, Romance, supra note 52 at 94; cf Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capital Punish-
ment, supra note 144, at 248 (finding that the films Dead Man Walking and Last 
Dance legitimize capital punishment by their "biographical focus" and "by insisting 
that all that counts is the question of responsibility"). 
187 For a similar argument, see Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 1123 
("the occasional state-sponsored killing of a woman materializes and so reinforces 
the liberal ideal of equality before the law, a principle that is otherwise mocked by 
the incredibly long odds against achieving this status."). 
188 See generally, ApPIER, supra note 41. 
189 See generally Daly & Tonry, supra note 41. 
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especially men of COlOr. 190 The death penalty reinforces manli-
ness through powerful, public violence against frightening, mas-
culine men, but the meanings of public violence against feminine 
subjects can be quite different. Most women who have been exe-
cuted have not been proper feminine subjects. Most women we 
have executed have not disrupted the masculinity of the 
enterprise. 
III 
EXECUTING FEMININITIES: KARLA FAYE TUCKER 
Consider again the dilemma of then-Governor Bush in deter-
mining whether to allow Karla Faye Tucker to live. His choice 
was not difficult. The question whether any woman should have 
her death sentence commuted is, of course, now inextricably 
complicated by the formal requirement of gender blindness. By 
allowing Karla Faye Tucker to be executed, Bush was able to 
prove his commitment to fairness and equality and perform 
toughness and masculinity. Bush wrapped himself in the duty of 
the decision, much as jurors understand the decision to vote for 
death as somehow compelled by duty.191 In his campaign autobi-
ography, Bush presented himself as pained by the decision ("one 
of the hardest things I have ever done"I92), but committed to the 
principle of gender equality. "My responsibility is to ensure our 
. laws are enforced fairly and evenly without preference or special 
treatment. ,,193 
Bush's decision to execute did not hurt him, as a supporter of 
the death penalty, but it did have an impact on public support for 
executions generally. The fact that it was politically safe for 
190 Is femininity, unlike race or class, beyond the controlling mechanisms of 
the state? Or is it more likely that gender, as one axis of social relations of 
inequality, simply does not require formalized state sanction as a means of 
discipline at this point in its history? When gender is challenged, extralegal 
violences, ranging from sexual harassment to rape and domestic violence, 
do the same work that law's violence does in managing the potential insta-
bility inspired by racial and class subordination. 
Heberle, supra note 30, at 1104 (footnote omitted). 
191 See Howarth, Deciding to Kill, supra note 5. 
192 GEORGE W. BUSH, A CHARGE TO KEEP 153-54 (1999). By this account, the 
pain of the execution is appropriated by the person carrying it out. For a similar 
stance, in which a Ninth Circuit judge presents his suffering (sleepless nights) in the 
face of having to deal with (in his judgment) baseless appeals from death row prison-
ers, see Alex Kozinski, Tinkering With Death, N. YORKER, Feb. 10,1997, at 48. 
193 BUSH, supra note 192, at 154. 
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then-Governor George W. Bush to deny clemency to Karla Faye 
Tucker 194 did not mean that the public was easy with her execu-
tion. By presenting the execution as compelled by gender neu-
trality, then-Governor Bush exploited our widespread discomfort 
with formalized, explicit exemptions for women, in spite of the 
many profound differences between the lives of men and women, 
many of which disadvantage women severely. Immediately prior 
to the scheduled execution of Karla Faye Tucker, only three per-
cent of those polled agreed that the execution should be can-
celled because Tucker was a woman.195 Those results reflect the 
resistance to formalized categorical exclusions from executions 
for women. 
People did not want all women to be protected, but they did 
not want to execute Karla Faye Tucker.196 In spite of the reluc-
tance to permit formal exemption on the basis of sex, Tucker's 
execution was sufficiently controversial in the country, in Texas, 
and even in Houston, to undermine support for capital punish-
ment. In the period prior to her execution, a poll conducted by 
the Dallas Morning News found that only forty-five percent of 
Texans supported Tucker's execution, although seventy-five per-
cent supported the death penalty.197 By another account, sup-
port for the death penalty among Texans fell from eighty-five 
percent in 1994 to sixty-eight percent six weeks after Karla Faye 
Tucker's execution.198 Shortly after Karla Faye Tucker's execu-
tion, an ABC News and Washington Post poll found that a ma-
jority of Americans (fifty-one percent) supported a national 
moratorium on the death penalty.199 If the death penalty law 
cannot discriminate between the monstrous and the likeable, 
some people do not want it. 
Karla Faye Tucker's transformation was especially perverse in 
194 For a discussion of that political safety, see Rapaport, Damned, supra note 30, 
at 594-99. 
195 Gross, Update, supra note 57, at 1466. 
196 As Karla Faye Tucker's execution date drew close, less than half of the Texans 
polled, forty-eight percent, supported the execution, although sixty-one percent of 
those polled supported capital punishment as policy. Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas, in 
First Time in 135 Years, is Set to Execute Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1998, at AI. 
197 Katz, supra note 61. A Houston Chronicle poll found that forty-eight percent 
believed Tucker should be executed, twenty-four percent believed her sentence 
should be commuted to life, and twenty-seven percent said they did not know 
enough about her to make a decision. [d. 
198 Kaufman-Osborn, Reviving, supra note 16, at 1120. 
199 Paul, supra note 90, at 22. 
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its reversed entanglings of killing and sexuality. The most mascu-
line aspect of her shocking crime was her boast that she exper-
ienced sexual climax every time she swung the pickaxe into the 
bodies.2°O Her linking killing with sexual satisfaction marked 
how far from feminine identity she had wandered. But, perhaps 
alone among the women executed since 1976, by the time of her 
execution, Karla Faye Tucker was conventionally attractive, a 
person who exuded not just charm but also sex. Beverly Lowry 
described meeting Tucker: "In that cold, walled-off setting, sur-
rounded by cold, walled-off people, Karla Faye threw her head 
back and guffawed-a hearty, full, genuine body-shaking guf-
faw-and I could see her direct, uncompromised, highly sexual 
charm.,,201 Perhaps her execution was especially troubling be-
cause the extermination of a sexually desirable woman came dan-
gerously close to something akin to a snuff film fantasy. Perhaps 
that helps to explain the persistence of official (male) resistance 
to even noticing, let alone acting favorably upon, Karla Faye 
Tucker's womanhood. 
Judith Butler has usefully deployed the notion of "drag": "The 
performance of drag plays upon the distinction between the anat-
omy of the performer and the gender that is being performed."202 
Some of Karla Faye Tucker's influence on public attitudes about 
the death penalty was based on her performance as "drag"; by 
the time of her execution, she was a criminal in drag as a super-
feminine, likeable, attractive women. Or maybe she was really a 
feminine person, with just one powerful masculine performance 
to live down. Karla Faye Tucker's execution was a "gender par-
ody"203 in ways that Wanda Jean Allen's and others' were not. 
Karla Faye Tucker was troubling in part because even in her 
resistance to special treatment,204 she presented herself as the 
kind of woman who should be respected, should be helped. Part 
200 See, e.g., Howarth, Feminism, supra note 9; Katz, supra note 61. 
201 Lowry, supra note 178, at 61. 
202 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 21, at 137. Drag highlights the "radi-
cal contingency in the relation between sex and gender in the face of cultural con-
figurations of causal unities that are regularly assumed to be natural and necessary." 
Id. at 138. 
203 Id. at 138. 
204 "Either you believe in the death penalty for everybody or you don't believe in 
it for anybody." Carol Rust, 'Gender Shouldn't be an Issue'; Death Row Inmate 
Claims Responsibility for Crimes, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 14, 1997, at Al (quoting 
Karla Faye Tucker). Karla Faye Tucker also stated "[g]ender shouldn't be an issue, 
period." Id. 
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of her charm and attractiveness was her desire not to be given 
special protection as a woman. "I say gender should not play any 
role in this at all."205 How feminine and self-sacrificing. This is 
the kind of woman who merits respect, not the kind to be com-
plaining about her lot or asking for special treatment. "Special 
treatment" is serious, powerful coded language in U.S. culture 
wars about racial justice, gay and lesbian rights, and women's 
rights. Special treatment would be contrary to the formal equal-
ity paradigm within which we operate. Executing such a present-
able, feminine, White woman undercut public support for the 
death penalty. The act of killing such an agreeable and lovely 
(feminine, White) person undercut the power of the execution. 
Killing a grim old White woman or a poor African American les-
bian can be· satisfying. But the death penalty should protect 
White innocence, not kill it. 
In at least one popular account of the execution of Karla Faye 
Tucker, she was said to have broken the "glass ceiling" of the 
death penalty. Bringing to capital punishment that phrase bor-
rowed from feminist tales of discrimination in the workplace 
trumpets the "equality" of the death penalty and thereby legiti-
mizes it. Camille Paglia supported the execution, claiming to be 
an "equal opportunity feminist."206 Again, we live in an era in 
which formal equality between men and women-no special 
treatment-is a dominant, controlling construct, both in law and 
in popular consciousness.207 Confined to that construct, some 
205 Daniel Pedersen, Praying for Time, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1998, at 66. 
206 Cockburn, supra note 159. 
As an equity feminist, I believe that women cannot demand equal opportu-
nities in society without also being ready to accept equal risks and responsi- . 
bilities. Women should not ask for special protections based on gender-
on death row or on the battlefield, where women with the right level of 
physical stamina and training should be sent into combat. 
Camille Paglia, Ask Camille, at http://www.salon.com/col/pagI/1998/02/17pagI2.html 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2002). 
207 See Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861, 862 
(1997) (discussing "constitutive" function of legal decisionmaking, that is the role of 
law in furthering popular knowledge). 
The law, in the course of fulfilling its prescriptive function, projects images 
of the groups appearing before the Court. These images then shape the 
way such groups are viewed by the larger society. Law in this sense per-
forms a function analogous to that of political rhetoric or the imagery of 
popular culture: it characterizes groups in ways that ultimately filter into 
popular understandings and counteract, or reinforce, the assumptions and 
stereotypes that already exist. 
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feminists called for the execution of Karla Faye Tucker in order 
not to set back women's progress. 
We also heard some anti-feminists chortling or sneering over 
the right to equal access to lethal injection that feminist politics 
had earned for women.208 Not otherwise known for his commit-
ment to fairness to women or to death rows inmates, then-gover-
ncr George W. Bush embraced Karla Faye Tucker's execution 
with anti-affirmative action rhetoric; "My responsibility is to 
make sure our laws are enforced fairly and evenly without pref-
erence or special treatment."209 
That version of feminism is not mine. My version of feminism 
is something like this. Crime is constructed as masculine. The 
socially constructed and endlessly reproduced identity of many 
men, especially poor men, especially African American and La-
tino men, is that of a criminaI,2lO The continuing use of violence 
and crime to construct masculinities is dangerous. Security and 
justice are unlikely in a political economy in which racialized and 
masculinist rituals of violence substitute for effective crime con-
trol policies. The deeply embedded associations between crimi-
nality and masculinities might mean that feminine criminal 
subjects allow us to see the criminal person, and therefore the 
causes and answers to crime. Women may be more easily sepa-
rated from the crimes that they have committed. We should cre-
ate justice for capital defendants by making each of them as 
visible, as human, as was Karla Faye Tucker. 
My feminist response is to present Karla Faye Tucker not as 
exceptional because she was a woman, but as exceptional be-
cause her gender transformation gave her the ability to be 
seen.211 Karla Faye Tucker was a very unusual woman. By her 
words and her face, she challenged important American miscon-
Id. Abrams acknowledges the popular dominance of formal gender equality, which 
she calls "equality theory" or "liberal feminism." Id. at 867-68. 
According to Abrams, formal gender equality "also advanced a notion--a notion 
still treated as synonymous with the term 'feminist'--that women are pervasively 
similar to men." Id. 
208 "To disregard the question of gender in making sense of [Karla Faye Tucker's 
execution] is to fail to understand why this media extravaganza elicited such barely 
concealed glee from feminism's detractors." Kaufman-Osborn, Introduction, supra 
note 30, at 1097. 
209 Katz, supra note 61 (quoting statement released by Bush). 
210 See, e.g., Howarth, Black Male Innocence, supra note 13 (discussing social 
constructions associating men of color with criminality). 
211 Karla Faye Tucker promoted her own case in similar terms. 
Executing White Masculinities 229 
ceptions about crime, rehabilitation, and capital punishment. 
She seemed like a criminal when she was charged: poor, strung 
out, arrogant, lethal, sexually dangerous. Her crude, brutal crime 
was all the more shocking because she was a woman. Her trans-
formation allowed America to see her as somebody who did not 
seem like a criminal. By the time of her execution, she seemed 
redeemed. She was faithful, sweet, pious, and articulate. There 
was no question of future dangerousness. Karla Faye Tucker was 
so thoroughly feminine that even her choice of a last meal-"Ba-
nana, Peach and Garden Salad with Ranch Dressing"-is starkly 
abberational amidst the usual steaks, burgers, and pizzas on the 
list of final meal requests published by the Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice.212 For those not titillated, the senselessness of 
Karla Faye Tucker's execution was easy to see. Her execution 
became a formal duty, justified by fairness to everyone else on 
death row. 
Because of the crimes for which they have been convicted, and 
because of entrenched systems of subordination that selected 
them for the ultimate punishment, most capital defendants do 
not have the capacity to be valued by disinterested strangers. 
Through an accident of gender transformation-gaining a strik-
ing feminine attractiveness-Karla Faye Tucker had that capac-
ity. My version of feminism says that we honor women, we 
honor ourselves, not by pretending not to care about Karla Faye 
Tucker, but by using the lesson of our caring about her to learn to 
care about the others on death row, the fifty-four women and 
3717 men of all races,213 whether illiterate, ugly, miserable, or 
frightening, whose executions would be just as senseless as was 
hers. 
212 Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Final Meal Requests, at http:// 
www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/finalmea!s.htm (last visited July 11, 2002). 
213 Death Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 3. They are 1593 African Americans, 347 
Latinos/as, 41 Asians, 41 Native Americans, and 1678 Whites. !d. 
